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ABSTRACT
Context: Probabilistic selling is the strategy that the seller creates an additional probabilis-
tic product using existing products. The exact information is unknown to customers until they
receive the probabilistic products. This strategy is still a relatively new area for both researchers
and practitioners. Many of the corresponding operations problems need to be solved to take full
advantage of the opportunity of this innovative marketing strategy. However, limited attention
has been paid to examining the inventory management of probabilistic selling from the perspec-
tive of Operations Management, which cannot meet the needs of decision-making in reality.
Objectives: Considering different characteristics of the probabilistic product, the buyer, and
the seller involved in probabilistic selling, i.e., the probabilistic product form, the buyers‚Äô
behaviours of demand switch and barter exchange, and the seller’s product allocation behaviour,
we establish models and solve the decision problems of pricing, inventory, joint decision of pricing-
inventory, and product allocation, etc. Based on the analysis of optimal decisions and strategy
comparison results, we shed some lights on the effectiveness of probabilistic selling on managing
uncertainty, and its profitability.
Method: First, we analyze the practice scenarios of probabilistic selling. Next we mainly
use newsvendor inventory model, hotelling model, and optimization theory to model, solve, and
analyze the operational problems. Then we give some analytical results. Next we conduct the
numerical analysis using softwares of Matlab and Mathematica. Finally, we provide insightful
managerial implications for the practice of probabilistic selling.
Results: The thesis derives the optimal operational decisions of inventory order, pricing,
inventory allocation, and product line design in probabilistic selling. Overall, the analysis of
the results show that probabilistic selling can benefit the seller with higher expected profit by
reducing demand/supply uncertainty and improving inventory efficiency. The performance of
probabilistic selling is closely dependent on customers’ price sensitivity, product similarity, and
uncertainty level, etc. Main results considering different research scenarios are as follows:
1) When the price for the probabilistic product is independent on demand reshape, a proper
cannibalization can benefit the retailer in terms of yielding a higher expected profit. Probabilistic
selling is more profitable with relatively lower product similarity and higher price-sensitive
customers, while inventory substitution strategy outperforms probabilistic selling with higher
product similarity.
2) When the price for the probabilistic product is dependent on demand reshape, probabilistic
selling can benefit the seller with higher expected profit and lower inventory. Probabilistic selling
is more profitable with lower product differentiation, higher customers’ price sensitivity, and
higher demand uncertainty. Improper pricing would undermine the seller’s profit.
i
3) When the seller offers physical probabilistic product, he can benefit from two effects, namely
the risk pooling effect due to demand reshape and the risk diversification effect due to inventory
flexibility.
4) When the seller offers barter choice in probabilistic selling, he may benefit from the
marketing effect in the barter process. Offering barter choice can broaden the application range
of probabilistic selling, which will increase with successful barter probability.
Conclusions/Implications: First, the thesis helps sellers understand how to manage their
inventory, pricing and related implementation issues to take full advantage of probabilistic
selling. Second, this thesis explores the mechanism of this innovative marketing strategy as an
inventory management tool to combat uncertainty which also riches the literature on Operations
Management, especially inventory management.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Opaque selling is becoming an emerging marketing strategy which first appeared in travel
industry. There are three prominent examples in travel industry to execute opaque selling:
Priceline, Hotwire and Germanwings. They also represent three different types of opaque selling
in literature: Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP), fixed opaque product (FOP), and variable opaque
products (VOP). NYOP is one type of opaque selling for some information about products (such
as suppliers, specific address, etc.) are unknown before customers confirm their purchases.
Priceline.com is the first executor of NYOP, which integrates service products from many providers
and then offers the consumers a right to bid the price of the service products including hotels,
flights and rental cars (Bai et al., 2015). Priceline will look for a product to match customers’
offer and charge the credit card once accept their offers. The second selling form is that some
other attributes except for price are concealed from customers. For example, intermediary like
Hotwire.com as shown in Fig. 1.1 would withhold information of some attributes of the service
(e.g., specific address of hotels or name of airline company) until customers finish the purchases
(Jiang, 2007). The third method named as variable opaque product (VOP) gives the customers
the right to choose the level of uncertainty (Post, 2010; Post and Spann, 2012). For example, if
you want to travel, the Germanwings.com allows you to select your departure airport and the
theme you prefer for the trip by choosing one among those offered products. The destination is
unknown and you can exclude certain destinations for charge. This method gives more flexibility
to customers and decrease the uncertainty. To facilitate comparison, we define the second form of
opaque selling as fixed opaque product (FOP).
The successful achievement in travel industry has inspired the interest of practitioners
of retailing industry (e.g., Tmall.com, jd.com, AgonSwim.com, Littleblackbag.com). From the
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.1: Hotwire.com website (The names of hotels are hidden)
perspective of an online retailer, Fay and Xie (2008) firstly defined probabilistic selling as “a
seller who creates probabilistic goods using existing distinct products or services and offers the
probabilistic product as customer’s additional choice” and examined why, when, and how a seller
can benefit from offering the probabilistic product. Fig. 1.2 gives an example of probabilistic
selling.
Most of existing literature consider probabilistic selling the same as opaque selling because
both strategies encourage the sellers to offer opaque products. However, the great difference
between probabilistic selling scenario and the above three opaque selling forms is the creation
method of opaque products. Opaque intermediaries which are common in travel industry gen-
erates the opaque product by mixing the products from different service providers. While in
retailing industry, the sellers usually generate the opaque product by mixing their existing
products. Furthermore, the capacity of service products in travel industry is usually fixed. In
contrast, the seller has to make inventory decision of the products in retailing industry.
Considering the significant difference of operations management between opaque product in
travel industry and opaque product in retailing industry, we consider probabilistic selling as one
form of opaque selling and focus on probabilistic selling strategy in the thesis. In order to avoid
ambiguity, we define the products sold with unknown information as “probabilistic product” or
“opaque product”, and the products sold with full information are named as “specific product” or
“component product” throughout the thesis.
Although motivated by marketing tools to price discriminate among customers, expand
market and improve margin price, opaque selling has also been proved by limited research to
benefit sellers on inventory management (Fay and Xie, 2011, 2014; Wu and Wu, 2015). However,
most of the rare operational research about opaque selling focus on the revenue management
solving control mechanism and pricing issues with fixed capacity (Gallego and Phillips, 2004;
Petrick et al., 2012; Gönsch and Steinhardt, 2013). The research that considers retailer’s inventory
decision with stochastic demand when offering probabilistic products is rare. The effect of this
selling strategy on inventory management, supply chain issues are confusing but interesting.
Overall, in terms of probabilistic selling, this strategy is still a relatively new area for both
2
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Figure 1.2: Probabilistic selling in Taobao.com
researchers and practitioners, though an emerging literature suggests that probabilistic selling is
promising and has broad potential applications. Many of the corresponding operations problems
need to be solved to take full advantage of the opportunity of this innovative marketing strategy.
1.2 Research objectives
Based on the urgent needs, research gaps and significance in practice application, we focus on
the inventory mechanism of probabilistic selling under different practical circumstances. We seek
to provide further insights into the probabilistic selling strategy in order to help sellers better
understand how to manage their inventory, pricing and related implementation issues when
introducing probabilistic selling. This part we will introduce the specific research motivations,
research lines, and results.
1.2.1 Managing demand uncertainty: Probabilistic selling versus inventory
substitution
Demand variability is prevailing in the current rapidly changing business environment, which
makes it difficult for a retailer that sells multiple substitutable products to determine the
optimal inventory. To combat demand uncertainty, both strategies of inventory substitution and
probabilistic selling can be used. Although the two strategies differ in operation, we believe
that they share a common feature in combating demand uncertainty by encouraging some
customers to give up some specific demand for the product to enable demand substitution. It
is interesting to explore which strategy is more advantageous to the retailer. We endogenize
the inventory decision and demonstrate the efficiency of probabilistic selling through demand
substitution. Then we analyze some special cases without cannibalization, and computationally
evaluate the profitability and inventory decisions of the two strategies in a more general case
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to generate managerial insights. The results show that the retailer should adjust inventory
decisions depending on products’ substitution possibility. The interesting computational result is
that probabilistic selling is more profitable with relatively lower product similarity and higher
price-sensitive customers, while inventory substitution outperforms probabilistic selling with
higher product similarity. Higher demand uncertainty will increase the profitability advantage of
probabilistic selling over inventory substitution.
1.2.2 Inventory decision in probabilistic selling with price-dependent
demand reshape
By considering that the demand switch from the higher-priced specific products to the lower-
priced probabilistic product depends on the price gap, we examine the optimal inventory decision
and expected profit in probabilistic selling. We investigate how probabilistic selling benefit the
seller through demand reshape and demand substitution in this circumstance. We perform a
simulation study to extensively explore the effects of demand uncertainty, demand correlation,
price sensitivity, and price discount on inventory decisions and profitability of probabilistic selling.
The results show that probabilistic selling can benefit the seller with higher expected profit
and lower inventory by reducing demand uncertainty and improving inventory efficiency, even
without considering the increased demand due to offering the low-priced probabilistic product.
Moreover, the effect of probabilistic selling is more significant with lower product differentiation,
higher customers’ price sensitivity, and higher demand uncertainty. It is noted that the optimal
selection of the price discount is necessary to secure good performance of probabilistic selling,
given that improper pricing will undermine seller’s profit.
1.2.3 Inventory-pricing policy in “physical” probabilistic selling
We investigates the impacts of a new type of probabilistic selling (PS) where the retailer orders
specific products and package some as a discounted physical probabilistic product (PPP) rather
than merely a virtual choice. We call this PS strategy as physical probability selling (PPS).
The price gap between the specific products and the probabilistic product result in demand
reshape, i.e., some customers who originally buy specific products will switch to buying the
probabilistic product, which decreases aggregate demand uncertainty. However the price discount
decreases the profit margin. Considering this trade off, we develop a three-product newsvendor
model to address the question of how to set the price for the PPP and make inventory allocation
decisions. We prove that there are two effects under PPS, namely the risk pooling effect due
to demand reshape and the risk diversification effect due to inventory flexibility. With demand
uncertainty, PPS can improve the retailer’s profit at lower inventory levels with proper demand
reshape induced by the optimal price discount. The optimal price discount increases with demand
uncertainty. PPS is more profitable with smaller product differentiation and higher customer
4
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price sensitivity. With supply uncertainty, we demonstrate through numerical studies that PPS is
a viable strategy to combat asymmetrical supply risk that yields higher profits and service levels.
1.2.4 Pricing-product allocation policy in probabilistic selling with barter
choice
After buying the probabilistic product, the customer who is not satisfied with the allocated
product may wish to barter with other customers. Moreover, there are online shops offering
customers the option to barter their allocated products before confirming their orders. Exploring
the seller’s motivation to offer the probabilistic product with barter choice, we consider two
questions: 1) How does barter affect the seller’s optimal decisions in probabilistic selling? 2) Can
and when does barter make probabilistic selling more advantageous to the seller? Considering
the key factors of product cost, successful barter probability, and the marketing benefit brought
by barter in probabilistic selling, we use the Hotelling model to address the questions. We show
that barter can broaden the application range of probabilistic selling, which will increase with
successful barter probability. When the marketing benefit is sufficiently large, barter can increase
the profit of probabilistic selling to the seller. When the marketing benefit is low while the barter
probability is high, barter will not benefit the seller in probabilistic selling. Our findings help the
seller make optimal decisions on barter choice, pricing, allocation probability, and product line
design, i.e., the seller merely offers the component products, merely the probabilistic product, or
both.
1.3 Research innovations
The thesis has the following innovative points:
1) We construct the newsvendor model to characterize the demand reshape and demand
substitution pattern in probabilistic selling. This is the first study that captures the inventory
decision in probabilistic selling considering demand reshape that is independent and dependent
with the price discount for the probabilistic product, respectively. We derive some management
suggestions for pricing and inventory management in probabilistic selling.
On the one hand, rare literature endogenize inventory decision in probabilistic selling and
majority literature set the demand for the specific product or the probabilistic product as deter-
ministic. While we consider stochastic demand for both the specific products and the probabilistic
product in our work except for the study on probabilistic selling with barter choice. This as-
sumption enables us to explore the performance of probabilistic selling on managing stochastic
demand, and improving inventory efficiency. On the other hand, the demand substitution and
demand reshape pattern in probabilistic selling is unique, which also riches the study on demand
reshape and demand substitution.
5
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2) We are the first study that compares the performance of probabilistic selling and inventory
substitution in managing demand uncertainty through demand substitution. Our work enriches
the research about probabilistic selling as an inventory management tool. The analytical approach
and research findings may help practitioners gain more insight on the capacity of probabilistic
selling on combating demand uncertainty, and facilitate their inventory related decision-making.
3) We are the first to explore the profitability and pricing-inventory policy of the retailer that
offers the physical probabilistic product (PPS). We analytically examine the risk-pooling effect
of PPS through demand reshape, and also find the risk diversification effect of PPS that helps
alleviate asymmetrical supply risk through numerical studies.
4) We are the first to examine the decisions on pricing, allocation probability, and product
line design, i.e., the seller merely offers the component products, merely the probabilistic product
or both, in probabilistic selling with the barter choice. The analysis helps the seller understand
when and how to offer the barter choice in probabilistic selling to achieve the maximum profit
with consideration of product cost, successful barter probability, marketing benefit brought by
per barter unit.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
S ome literature regards probabilistic selling the same as opaque selling. However, prob-abilistic selling is based on the retailing industry, and the operations management inretailing industry is very different from that in the travel industry. For example, inventory
is usually constrained in the travel industry while in retailing industry the seller has to make
inventory decision. Furthermore, the intermediary retailer in travel industry creates the opaque
product by mixing the products from different service providers, while in the retailing industry
the seller usually creates the opaque product by mixing his own existing products. Therefore, we
consider probabilistic selling as one form of opaque selling in our thesis. Although we focus on
the probabilistic selling form in our research, literature about other forms of opaque selling is
also necessary for they share the same spirit of opaque products. Some results or observations in
related research on other forms of opaque selling still give us some important reference value.
Then we will give a comprehensive review about opaque selling. Considering different motivations
and methods in related research, we divide the literature into two streams. One investigates
opaque selling in economics and marketing literature, and the other one considers this selling
strategy from the aspect of operations management.
The economics and marketing literature considers different issues with respect to different
implementation forms in practice: NYOP, FOP, VOP and PS. Table 2.1 shows us the basic
characteristics of different forms of opaque selling. The research on NYOP, FOP, VOP is usually
based on the scenario of a service provider-intermediary system. And the research on probabilistic
selling is based on the scenario of a service/product seller-customer system.
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Table 2.1: Different forms of opaque selling
Form
Posted
price
Opaqueness
Creation of probabilistic
product/opaque product
Supply chain system
NYOP No Fixed
Product/service integra-
tor
service provider-
intermediary system
FOP Yes Fixed
Product/service integra-
tor
service provider-
intermediary system
VOP Yes Flexible
Product/service integra-
tor
service provider-
intermediary system
PS Yes Fixed Product/service owner
service/product seller-
customer
2.1 Opaque selling in economics and management
2.1.1 Name-Your-Own-Price
The NYOP modes opened by service integrators have been fully discussed (Hann and Terwiesch
2003; Fay 2004; Terwiesch et al. 2005). The research focus on multi aspects: pricing especially
the optimal threshold price, bidding patterns (repeat bidding or single bidding) and effectiveness
analysis (Bai et al., 2015). Because we focus on opaque selling strategy with posted price, we
won’t give a detailed review about the NYOP mode research.
2.1.2 Fixed opaque product
Some literature explore the optimal strategy and profit ability of fixed opaque product in a
monopolist market (i.e., one service provider in the service provider-intermediary system). Some
papers focus on investigating the effect of fixed opaque product on pricing competition, market
share, etc. in competitive environments (i.e., multiple service providers in the service provider-
intermediary system). And some research devote to comparing effectiveness of opaque selling
with other selling strategies. Most of the research address the decisions on pricing, competition,
channel selection, and optimal transparency level.
2.1.2.1 Fixed opaque product in a monopolist market
Granados et al. (2005) develop an economic model of a supplier who distributes products across
two channels with different levels of market transparency. The model provides guidelines for
firms to set optimal transparency levels and prices with profit maximization. And the market
transparency is related with willing to pay. Jiang (2007) considers a monopoly firm selling
multiple flights a day. The airlines decide whether to offer both the full-information tickets with
regular price and opaque tickets at a discounted price or just one of them. They find that opaque
selling can increase a firm’s sales and profits depending on customer heterogeneity in terms of
their willingness to pay for a particular flight. Especially when customers are too heterogeneous,
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the firm will prefer to offer only full-information products. The study of Anderson and Xie (2012)
use a nested logit model along with logistic regression and dynamic programming to set the
optimal choice-based price for a service provider to post on the opaque intermediary. Cai et al.
(2013) investigated probabilistic selling under which the retailer generates the probabilistic good
by mixing products from different suppliers. They studied how probabilistic selling endogenously
influences suppliers’ channel selections.
2.1.2.2 Fixed opaque product in a competitive market
From the perspectives of opaque intermediary in competitive environments, Fay (2008) publishes
the first paper to model an intermediary selling an opaque product. He considers two symmetric
service providers who share a common opaque intermediary. Customers are divided into the
“brand-loyals” and the “searchers” which are represented by a Hotelling model. The paper
analyzes the pricing equilibrium and the profitability with firm competition. The results show
that there is fierce competition if there is little brand-loyalty in the marketplace. However, if
brand-loyalty amount is moderate, entry of an intermediary would enable service providers to
raise prices. Shapiro and Shi (2008) and Tappata (2012) extend the two service provider scenario
into multiple service providers by using the circular city model in Salop (1979). Shapiro and
Shi (2008) attempt to explore the effect of opaque intermediary on the competition of service
providers. The results show that although the opaque intermediary intensifies competition for
less sensitive (non-loyals) customers, it can segment the market and allow the service providers
charge a higher price for more sensitive customers(loyals). Tappata (2012) shares the same
setting while allowing for elastic aggregate demand in their model. Further they also study the
welfare effect of opaque intermediary. The results show that opaque intermediary can create
welfare by increasing price competition and expanding market sales compared with no opaque
intermediary model. Service providers can use the opaque intermediary to increase profits with
intermediate product differentiation value. Other related literature also consider competing
firms selling opaque products through an intermediary (Jerath et al., 2010, 2009). Granados
et al. (2017) investigate the demand and cannibalization effects of the opaque channel through
empirical study of an international airline. They find that airlines can benefit from opaque selling
in markets with high levels of competition.
2.1.2.3 Strategy comparison
Jerath et al. (2010)constructed a stylized economic model in which two firms with fixed capacities
sell products to consumers in two periods. They attempt to explain and compare the benefits of
using either transparent last-minute sales or opaque sales through an intermediary. They find
that sales through opaque intermediary are preferred when consumer valuations for travel are
lower or there is higher service differentiation between competing service providers. Gal-Or (2011)
compares the profit of a monopoly service provider who can use either a price-posted or a NYOP
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opaque selling channel. They show that NYOP is preferable for a monopoly service provider.
However, in the presence of competition within service providers, opaque selling with posted price
is more profitable with price competition (Chen et al., 2014). Anderson and Xie (2014) considers
a monopolist using three selling channels: a full information channel, an opaque channel with
posted price and NYOP. The paper illustrates how opaque channels segment consumers and
compares optimal revenues and prices for sellers using full information channels with the three
channels situation.
2.1.3 Variable opaque product
VOP method gives more flexibility to customers who can set the opaqueness rather than the
service provider (Post, 2010). Research about VOP mode investigate on the design problems of
price structure, opacity design and opaque packages, etc.
For example, Post (2010) proposed the term “variable opaque product” through the case
of airline industry and develop a pricing heuristic to maximize the incremental revenue from
opaque selling with varied opaqueness level. This product-price pricing structure provides a
useful basis for price optimization models for VOP. Lee et al. (2012) discuss how to design opaque
destination packages for airline carrier. They use a multidimensional binary logit model to predict
the purchase probability which is influenced by distance, city attractiveness and length of stay.
Post and Spann (2012) take the “Blind Booking” at Germanwings as the case and analyze some
significant results from the implementation of VOP. The encouraging results of“Blind Booking”
show that, with reasonable product price and opacity level (Germanwings requires no less than
3 destinations), the revenues generated by VOP would be predominantly incremental without
cannibalization. Bai et al. (2015) investigate the design problems of pricing, opacity design and
depict how customers choose marketing channels based on “Blind Booking” at Germanwings.
2.1.4 Probabilistic selling
The research on probabilistic selling is based on a retailer-customer system. The economics and
marketing literature related to probabilistic selling demonstrate the profit ability of probabilistic
selling in conditions concerning different characteristics of subjects (e.g., market, customer,
product) as shown in Table 2.2. They explore the benefits of probabilistic selling in terms of price
discrimination, market segmentation and expansion, and product line extension etc.
Fay and Xie (2008) firstly define probabilistic selling strategy and attempts to use Hotelling
model and Circle model to explore the fundamental conditions required for offering “probabilistic
products”. The results show that offering probabilistic products can combat demand uncertainty
and enhance inventory efficiency. Huang and Yu (2014) explores the importance of consumer
bounded rationality on the adoption of probabilistic selling and demonstrates that consumer
bounded rationality in probabilistic selling may soften price competition and increase the in-
dustry profits. Rice et al. (2014) make comparison of markdown selling and probabilistic selling
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Table 2.2: Probabilistic selling on economics and marketing.
Subject Focus Literature
Seller
Monopolist
Fay and Xie (2008); Huang and Yu (2014)
Rice et al. (2014); Zhang et al. (2014)
Market Competition None
Customer
Preference heterogeneity
Fay and Xie (2008); Rice et al. (2014)
Fay et al. (2015)
Loyalty heterogeneity Fay (2008); Shapiro and Shi (2008)
Bounded rationality Huang and Yu (2014)
Product
Horizontal product
Fay and Xie (2008); Huang and Yu (2014)
Fay and Xie (2008); Rice et al. (2014)
Fay et al. (2015)
Vertical product Zhang et al. (2014)
Horizontal or vertical product Huang and Yu (2014)
strategies. As price discrimination tools, markdown selling strategy depends on buyer patience
and probabilistic selling segments market based on buyer preference. They identify the condi-
tions required for probabilistic selling to be more advantageous through analytical model. The
results show that probabilistic selling can improve margin management and inventory utilization.
Zhang et al. (2014) investigate probabilistic selling in quality-differentiated markets rather than
horizontal markets and explore whether probabilistic selling can be profitable in this situation.
The above literature focus on the profit ability of probabilistic selling concerning different
characteristics of markets, customers and products. They consider how probabilistic selling
influence seller’s decision and customers’ purchase choice. Another direction is to explore the
effect of probabilistic selling on product design. For example, Fay et al. (2015) find that introducing
probabilistic products by mixing component products can not get the full potential of probabilistic
selling. The retailer should also adjust its product mix (e.g., optimal number and types of products)
when introducing probabilistic products. The paper reveals that, when facing several consumer
segments with diverse preferences, a seller should produce more differentiated products when it
moves to probabilistic selling from TS. Otherwise, when there are few consumers with moderate
tastes, the retailer should produce less differentiated products when switching to probabilistic
selling.
2.2 Opaque selling in operations management
One stream of operational research focus on the revenue management of opaque selling which
solve control mechanism and pricing issues with fixed capacity (as shown in Table 2.3). Flexible
products belongs to this stream. Flexible product is firstly defined as a menu of two or more
alternative products offered by a supply chain issues constrained supplier in Gallego and Phillips
(2004). And the supplier reserves some information of flexible product until a time near the end
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of the booking process. Therefore, we assume flexible product is the same as probabilistic product.
Gallego and Phillips (2004) analyze the two-flight case for an airline with fixed capacity offering
flexible products and specific products simultaneously. Considering demand induction and canni-
balization, they use simulation to compare results under various control structures and different
pricing scenarios. Different from Gallego and Phillips (2004), Petrick et al. (2012) consider an
arbitrary notification date within the booking horizon in a similar problem setting. They present
several revenue management models and control mechanisms for offering flexible products and
reveal that flexible products can increase revenue with fixed capacity and unpredictable demand.
Gönsch and Steinhardt (2013) extend dynamic programming decomposition techniques to develop
a new approach for service provider to control capacity in situation of offering both opaque
products and traditional ones simultaneously. They show that their approach outperforms other
well known capacity control approaches used in the opaque product setting with a simulation
study.
The second stream focus on exploring the inventory mechanism of probabilistic selling. Fay
and Xie (2011) regard probabilistic selling as a new mechanism for inventory management in
the presence of demand uncertainty although the seller commits to buyers before it has the
opportunity to acquire more information. Fay and Xie (2014) extend the novel strategy from a
marketing tool to an inventory-management mechanism, which focus on the impact of timing
of probabilistic product assignment and demonstrate the advantage of probabilistic selling to
improve inventory utilization. As shown in Table 2.3, the above research dealing with inventory
management consider the “scenario” uncertainty that one product is more popular than the other
with a probability. Rare literature consider stochastic demand rather than “scenario” uncertainty
except for Wu and Wu (2015) and Fu et al. (2017). Endogenizing both capacity and pricing
decisions in a single-product system, Wu and Wu (2015) considers the stochastic demand in their
single-product inventory model, integrating demand postponement and opaque selling from the
perspective of travel intermediary. The result demonstrate that the postponement of delivery
allows the firm to use less safety stock to hedge against demand uncertainty. Fu et al. (2017)
analytically demonstrated that offering a flexible product can improve the seller’s profit.
The third stream of literature attempt to expand probabilistic selling into supply chain. For
example, Li and Ma (2016) developed a non-cooperative dynamic price Stackelberg game model
to study the dynamic characteristics of a supply chain under probabilistic selling with risk-averse
customer.
2.3 Comments on the literature
Great majority of the research focus on analyzing the rationality of the mechanism, the imple-
mentation issues and the profit ability from the aspect of marketing tool with economic models.
Limited literature consider opaque selling in increasing inventory efficiency with constrained
12
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Table 2.3: Distinguishing characteristics of related literature on operational management.
Subject Focus Literature
Capacity
Constrained
Gallego and Phillips (2004); Petrick et al. (2012)
Gönsch and Steinhardt (2013)
Non-constrained Fay and Xie (2014); Wu and Wu (2015)
Demand
Scenario uncertainty Fay and Xie (2014)
Stochastic uncertainty
Gallego and Phillips (2004); Petrick et al. (2012)
Gönsch and Steinhardt (2013); Wu and Wu (2015)
capacity on revenue management. However, rare literature consider opaque selling in an opera-
tional management setting and explore the effect of opaque selling on operational issues such
as capacity planning, procurement, supply chain coordination, etc. Just as Wu and Wu (2015)
refers that future research should include how probabilistic selling affect inventory decisions and
supply-chain dynamics.
Overall, opaque selling is still a relatively new market practice and has aroused interests
from service providers, commerce retailers, customers and researchers. It is urgent to help firms
to develop an optimal strategy for adopting this selling strategy. We will focus on the form of
probabilistic selling in this thesis and shed light on the logic of this strategy considering more
practical settings.
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MANAGING DEMAND UNCERTAINTY: PROBABILISTIC SELLING
VERSUS INVENTORY SUBSTITUTION
3.1 Introduction
The prevailing variability of the business environment, rapidly evolving technologies, fierce
competition, and sophisticated customer demands are increasing the difficulty for firms to
determine the optimal inventory under demand uncertainty. For example, many retailers try
to capture market share and meet customers’ various demands by carrying a wide variety of
products. Usually the products are similar and may be substitutable, e.g., clothes in different
colour, beverages with different flavours, and bags in different patterns. Although increasing
product variety can increase the retailer’s market size, it would also increase its total inventory,
leading to longer inventory cycles and higher safety stock (Rajagopalan, 2013). In addition,
any mis-match between inventory and demand, even for a single product, would reduce profit
due to the inventory cost or stock-out cost. Uncertain demand for multiple products makes it
more arduous to match supply and demand for improving inventory efficiency. Therefore, it is
important to effectively manage demand uncertainty when firms seek to benefit from market
expansion through increasing product variety.
To address the problem of managing demand uncertainty with multiple substitutable products,
the retailer can consider two strategies, namely inventory substitution, which is well known in
Operations Research, and probabilistic selling, which is popular in Marketing. Being an effective
tool to minimize the mis-match between capacity and demand, inventory substitution uses
substitute products to meet demand when stock-out occurs (Mcgillivray and Silver, 1978; Parlar
and Goyal, 1984; Ernst and Kouvelis, 1999). Probabilistic selling means the retailer creates an
additional probabilistic product with hidden information using existing products (Fay and Xie,
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2008). For instance, travel agencies offer probabilistic service products (e.g., hotel rooms, air
tickets, package tours etc.) with some information concealed from customers until customers
confirm their orders. Online retailers like Tmall.com, Amazon.com, and AgonSwim.com (Fay and
Xie, 2010) offer discounted probabilistic products with some attributes, e.g., colour, style, brand
etc, unknown to customers until they receive the products. The price-sensitive customers who are
indifferent to the attributes would choose to buy discounted probabilistic products.
Although the two strategies are triggered by the need to address different problems in
different research fields, we see that both strategies share the same spirit of demand substitution.
Specifically, in applying inventory substitution, the retailer substitutes the remaining inventory
of one product for another. The customer whose required product is sold out can choose to accept
the substitute or not. In applying probabilistic selling, the retailer offers customers an additional
lower-priced choice to enhance the demand substitution of specific products with full information
by the probabilistic product. Inventory substitution induces insensitive customers and makes
use of available inventory (of a substitute product) at the end stage of selling, while probabilistic
selling induces insensitive customers at the beginning stage and then uses available inventory
(of either the requisite product or a substitute product) during the selling stage. Consequently,
the retailer can substitute products through the demand of insensitive customers to minimize
the mis-match between inventory and demand. Although the two strategies differ in operation to
hedge against demand uncertainty, they share a common characteristic in combating demand
uncertainty by encouraging some customers to give up some specific demand, e.g., colour, pattern
etc, for the product to enable demand substitution. Therefore, it is interesting to explore which
strategy is more advantageous for the retailer that sells substitutable products with demand
uncertainty.
However, despite the popularity of probabilistic selling in marketing research for the purposes
of market expansion and price discrimination (Fay and Xie, 2008, 2014), little is known about
probabilistic selling as an inventory tool. There is little research on using economic models to
analyze the inventory mechanism of probabilistic selling (Fay and Xie, 2011, 2014). The first
study that endogenizes the capacity decision is Wu and Wu (2015), which explores opaque selling
as a strategy to induce demand postponement. They considered the one-product scenario with
stochastic demand from the perspective of an intermediary. While we also study probabilistic
selling in the newsvendor setting, we focus on exploring the inventory ability of probabilistic
selling from the perspective of a retailer that can manage demand uncertainty through demand
substitution.
In this chapter we develop a single-period newsvendor model with three products to analyze
probabilistic selling with a view to generating insights into using probabilistic selling to manage
demand uncertainty. We then compare probabilistic selling with inventory substitution in the
special cases without cannibalization. To gain additional insights into the normal situation,
we use computational examples to compare the two strategies in terms of overall profit and
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inventory with considerations of customer transition (reflected by the cannibalization index under
probabilistic selling and by the substitution fraction under inventory substitution) and demand
uncertainty.
We make two main contributions under this chapter: First, this is the first study that captures
the inventory decision in probabilistic selling considering the cannibalization effect. Second, this is
the first study that compares the performance of probabilistic selling and inventory substitution
in managing demand uncertainty through demand substitution. The results show that the
retailer’s inventory decisions depends on products’ substitution possibility. The comparison results
show that probabilistic selling outperforms inventory substitution with relatively lower product
similarity and higher price-sensitive customers, while inventory substitution is more profitable
than probabilistic selling when product similarity is higher. Besides, higher demand uncertainty
will increase the profitability advantage of probabilistic selling over inventory substitution. Our
work enriches the research about probabilistic selling as an inventory management tool. The
analytical approach and research findings may help practitioners gain more insight on the
capacity of probabilistic selling on combating demand uncertainty, and facilitate their inventory
related decision-making.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Probabilistic selling
Limited attention has been paid to examining the inventory mechanism of probabilistic
selling. Fay and Xie (2011) regarded probabilistic selling as a new mechanism for inventory
management in the presence of demand uncertainty despite that the seller is committed to buyers
before it has the opportunity to acquire more information. Focusing on the impact of the timing
of the assignment of the probabilistic product, Fay and Xie (2014) demonstrated the advantage
of probabilistic selling in improving inventory utilization. Nevertheless, the uncertainty in the
above studies concerns the probability that one product is more popular than another, and they
use the “scenario-based” approach to represent uncertainty (Gupta and Maranas, 2003) rather
than the “distribution-based” approach. Just as Rice et al. (2014) pointed out that little research
has shown the effectiveness of probabilistic selling when the seller is uncertain about the total
category demand rather than the relative popularity of a specific item.
Different from the above literature, we model the demand as normally distributed with
a mean and a standard deviation, which is widely used in OM research. Some studies have
considered demand uncertainty and recognized the benefit of probabilistic products in increasing
inventory efficiency with fixed capacity in the study field of revenue management (Gallego and
Phillips, 2004; Gönsch and Steinhardt, 2013). However, they don’t endogenize inventory decision
in their research. Then Wu and Wu (2015) considered stochastic demand in their single-product
inventory model, and integrated demand postponement and opaque selling from the perspective
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of a travel intermediary. They showed that postponement of delivery allows the firm to use less
safety stock to combat demand uncertainty. Different from Wu and Wu (2015), the demand for
the probabilistic product is also stochastic and we explore probabilistic selling as an inventory
mechanism from the perspective of a retailer selling multiple alternative products. Furthermore,
we focus on comparing probabilistic selling and inventory substitution, both of which use demand
substitution to hedge against demand uncertainty.
3.2.2 Inventory substitution
There is a large body of work on inventory management with substitutable demand. The
substitution phenomenon has been widely investigated considering various substitution patterns.
The substitution can be led by the supplier, which is common in the airline industry (Vulcano
et al., 2012). It can also be led by the customer that is willing to buy a substitute product
when their preferred product is out of stock (Parlar and Goyal, 1984; Ernst and Kouvelis, 1999;
Baris and Selcuk, 2013; Ye, 2014). The substitution scenarios considered in existing research
include two products with one-way or two-way substitution (Mcgillivray and Silver, 1978; Parlar
and Goyal, 1984), three products with partial substitution (Ernst and Kouvelis, 1999), and an
arbitrary number of products with demand substitution (Netessine and Rudi, 2003; Wang and
Parlar, 1994). According to the probability of customers willing to accept substitution, some
research considers total substitution (i.e., the probability is equal to 1) (Mcgillivray and Silver,
1978; Pasternack and Drezner, 1991) or constant substitution (i.e., the probability is between
0 and 1) (Parlar and Goyal, 1984; Ernst and Kouvelis, 1999). Some studies assume that the
revenue received for a product is independent of the substitution, while others assume that the
substitution will incur a performance-related cost (Pasternack and Drezner, 1991). Shah and
Avittathur (2007) examined cannibalization considering the downward substitution pattern with
a standard product and its customized extensions. We consider partial substitution with cost as
Parlar and Goyal (1984) and Pasternack and Drezner (1991) in our study.
3.3 Inventory decision under inventory substitution
3.3.1 Notation and Assumption
We consider a retailer that sells two specific products, indexed i, j=1,2 (it is assumed that
i 6= j). The retailer purchases a quantity Q ti of product i and a quantity Q tj of product j at the
same fixed unit cost c > 0, and sells them at price p. The clearance price is s. The stock-out
penalty is 0. We assume that the demand D i (D j) is normally distributed with mean ui (u j) and
standard deviation σi (σ j). Let f (xi) ( f (x j)) and F(xi) (F(x j)) be the probability density function
and cumulative density function of D i (D j), respectively. In addition, let f (xi, x j) be the joint
probability density function of the demand for the products. When the retailer adopts neither
probabilistic selling nor inventory substitution, the optimal inventory decision for each product is
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just the optimal inventory decision for the single-product newsvendor model, i.e., the optimal
order quantities Qs
∗
i and Q
s∗
j are determined by the following equations:
F(Q t
∗
i )=
p− c
p− s , (3.1)
F(Q t
∗
j )=
p− c
p− s . (3.2)
Now we consider the case where the retailer adopts inventory substitution and assume that
only a fraction rs of the unsatisfied customers that face stock-out will accept the substitution
(Parlar and Goyal, 1984). Assume that substitution incurs a cost t per unit (Pasternack and
Drezner, 1991). We also suppose that p− t > s to make sure that the retailer can benefit from
substitution. Substitution occurs when the demand for product i ( j) exceeds its supply while
the demand for product j (i) is less than its supply (i.e., the substitution paths in Fig. 3.1. After
substitution, the total demand for product i may or may not be satisfied.
Figure 3.1: Substitution paths in adopting inventory substitution.
3.3.2 The optimal inventory solution
The expected profit is given in Eq.(3.3), which comprises the revenue, the savage cost,
and the acquisition cost. (Qsi ,Q
s
j) are the two inventory decisions that jointly maximize the
expected profit. The demand for product i( j) comes from the original demand and the substitution
demand when demand of product j(i) excess its supply. Therefore, the revenue under inventory
substitution comes from satisfying both the original demand (i.e. min(D j,Qsj) and min(D i,Q
s
i ) and
the substitution demand (i.e. min
[
(Qsi −D i)+, rs(D j−Qsj)+
]
and min
[
rs(D i−Qsi )+, (Qsj −D j)+
]
).
E(Qsi ,Q
s
j)=E

pmin(D i,Qsi )+ pmin(D j,Qsj)− c(Qsi +Qsj)
+(p− t)min
[
(Qsi −D i)+, rs(D j−Qsj)+
]
+(p− t)min
[
rs(D i−Qsi )+, (Qsj −D j)+
]
+s
[
(Qsi −D i)++ (Qsj −D j)+− rs(D i−Qsi )+− rs(D j−Qsj)+
]
.
(3.3)
Pasternack and Drezner (1991) have shown the concave property of the expected profit. So
the optimal inventory decisions can be determined by applying the first-order condition to the
expected total profit function. We characterize the optimal order quantities (Qs
∗
i ,Q
s∗
j ) in Eq.(3.4),
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which is similar to the results in Rudi et al. (2001). F(Q
s∗
i ) =
p−c+(p−t−s)R(Qs∗i ,Qs
∗
j )
p−s
F(Qs
∗
j ) =
p−c+(p−t−s)T(Rs∗i ,Qs
∗
j )
p−s ,
(3.4)
where
R(Qs
∗
i ,Q
s∗
j )=
∫ Qsi
0
∫ ∞
Qs∗j +(Qs
∗
i −D ti)/rs
f (xi, x j)dx jdxi− rs
∫ Qs∗j
0
∫ Qs∗i +(Qs∗j −D tj)/rs
Qs∗i
f (xi, x j)dxidx j,
T(Qs
∗
i ,Q
s∗
j )=
∫ Qs∗j
0
∫ ∞
Qs∗i +(Qs
∗
j −D tj)/rs
f (xi, x j)dx jdxi− rs
∫ Qs∗i
0
∫ Qs∗j +(Qs∗i −D ti)/rs
Qs∗j
f (xi, x j)dxidx j.
The first term of R(Qs
∗
i ,Q
s∗
j ) raises Q
s
i due to the possibility that the excess inventory of
product i may not meet the substitution demand for product j, while the second term lowers Qsi
because the substitution demand for product Qsi can be satisfied with the excess inventory of
product Qsj . The same observation holds for T(Q
s∗
i ,Q
s∗
j ).
3.4 Inventory decision under probabilistic selling
3.4.1 Notation and assumption
Under probabilistic selling, the offer of the probabilistic product indexed k may cannibal-
ize the specific product market (Granados et al., 2010; Post and Spann, 2012). So, given the
cannibalization effect, the observed demand distribution needs to be revised as (Dpi ,D
p
j ,D
p
k ) in
Section 3.4.2. As before, the retailer has to purchase quantities Qdj , Q
d
i , and Q
d
k to meet the
demands for the specific products i, j, and the probabilistic product k, respectively. The quantity
Qdk is a mix of products i and j. If we assume that the proportion of product i in the mix is r, then
the retailer has to order Qpi =Q
d
i +rQ
d
k of product i and Q
p
j =Q
d
j +(1−r)Qdk of product j.
Following Fay and Xie (2014), Jerath et al. (2010), and Wu and Wu (2015) in operationalizing
probabilistic selling, we assume that probabilistic selling postpones the delivery of the probabilis-
tic product with regular price to meet the substitution demand for a specific product sold at a
higher price. The retailer obtains revenue p for each specific product and p0 (p> p0 > s) for each
probabilistic product sold. Since the consumer of the probabilistic product pays a lower price,
they would accept uncertainty about product availability and postponement of product delivery.
Fig. 3.2 shows the sequence of events.
3.4.2 Revised demand distribution
We consider the cannibalization effect on the specific products, which means that the demand
for the probabilistic product Dpk consists of two parts: the demand that switches from the specific
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Figure 3.2: The sequence of events.
products to the probabilistic product, and the new market expansion demand Dk induced by the
low-priced probabilistic product. We assume that Dk is normally distributed with mean uk and
standard deviation σk. The demand D i and D j, and the demand D i(D j) and the new market
expansion demand Dk are correlated with ρ i j and ρ ik(ρ jk), respectively. Let ai (a j) be the canni-
balization index of the demand for the specific product i ( j) (0≤ ai(a j)≤ 1), which is independent
of Dk. The observed demand for the probabilistic product is given by D
p
k =aiD i+a jD j+Dk.
The observed demands Dpi and D
p
j are different from the original demands D i and D j in
traditional selling. It is important to define the demand relationships between traditional selling
and probabilistic selling, for we will compare the two selling strategies with respect to the
inventory decision and expected profit. Following Eynan and Fouque (2003), and Hsieh (2011),
we characterize the distribution parameters of the observed demands Dpi , D
p
j , and D
p
k under
probabilistic selling as follows:
upi = (1−ai)ui,
upj = (1−a j)u j,
σ
p
i = (1−ai)σi,
σ
p
j = (1−a j)σ j,
upk = aiui+a ju j+uk,
σ
p
k =
√
a2iσ
2
i +a2jσ2j +σ2k+2aiρ ikσiσk+2a jρ jkσ jσk+2aia jρ i jσiσ j .
Because the demand for the probabilistic product includes a part of the original demands for
the specific products, the demand correlation after cannibalization should be updated as follows:
ρ∗ik =
aiσi+a jρ i jσ j+ρ ikσk
σ
p
k
, (3.5)
ρ∗jk =
a jσ j+aiρ i jσi+ρ jkσ jσk
σ
p
k
. (3.6)
So we define the joint probability density function of the demand for the products under
probabilistic selling f (xi, x j, xk) as f ∗(xi, x j, xk) after cannibalization.
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Figure 3.3: The substitution pattern under probabilistic selling.
3.4.3 Substitution pattern
Probabilistic selling encourages substitution between the specific products and the probabilistic
product when stock-out occurs. As shown in Fig. 3.3, different from inventory substitution, there
is no direct substitution between the specific products. The substitution between the specific
products occurs through the probabilistic product. Besides, the offer of probabilistic selling may
increase total product sales.
Furthermore, there are two stages of substitution owing to postponement of product delivery
under probabilistic selling. In the first stage of substitution, substitution occurs to meet the
demands for the higher-priced specific products. For instance, if the demand realization of either
specific product i ( j) exceeds its available inventory Qdi (Q
d
j ), the retailer can select the popular
product i ( j) from the probabilistic product inventory Qdk to meet the high-priced demand first. In
the second stage of substitution, if the demand for the probabilistic product exceeds its remaining
inventory after the first stage of substitution while the specific products are available, either of
the specific products can serve as a substitute. There is no possibility that both specific products
i and j are out of stock when the demand for the probabilistic product can be fully satisfied.
3.4.4 The optimal inventory decision
The decision variables in the inventory model are (Qpi ,Q
p
j ) rather than (Q
d
i ,Q
d
j ,Q
k
j ). Thus
it suffices to characterize the second stage of substitution. Specifically, we present these cases
and their corresponding probabilities of occurrence in Table 3.1. For instance, Case 3 means
that product j is out of stock, while product i has excess inventory, and the excess inventory is
sufficient to cover the demand for the probabilistic product. The expected profit, which includes
the revenue, the savage cost, and the acquisition cost, is given as follows:
E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )=E

pmin(Dpi ,Q
p
i )+ pmin(D
p
j ,Q
p
j )− c(Q
p
i +Q
p
j )
+p0 min
[
Dk, [(Q
p
i −D
p
i )
++ (Qpj −D
p
j )
+]
]
+s
[
(Qpi −D
p
i )
++ (Qpj −D
p
j )
+−Dk
]+
.
(3.7)
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Table 3.1: Classification scheme for all the possible cases and their corresponding occurring
probabilities
Case i j k Probability
1 Yes Yes Yes Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k < (Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j ))
2 Yes Yes No Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k > (Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j ))
3 Yes No Yes Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j >Q
p
j ,D
p
k < (Q
p
i −D
p
i ))
4 Yes No No Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j >Q
p
j ,D
p
k > (Q
p
i −D
p
i ))
5 No Yes Yes Pr(Dpi >Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k < (Q
p
i −D
p
i ))
6 No Yes No Pr(Dpi >Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k > (Q
p
i −D
p
i ))
7 No No No Pr(Dpi >Q
p
i ,D
p
j >Q
p
j ,D
p
k > (Q
p
i −D
p
i ))
Proposition 3.1. If the distribution function of the demand is continuous and differentiable,
then the expected profit function is concave in (Qpi ,Q
p
j ).
Proof. See the Appendix A.
It can be recognized from Eq.(3.7) and Table 3.1 that the modelling of product i and product j
are symmetrical. We just analyze the inventory decision of one product and the analysis of the
other product is similar. Differentiating the expected total profit once, we obtain the expected
value of a marginal unit of product i as follows:
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
∂Qpi
= p(1−Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ))
+p0[Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j >Q
p
j ,D
p
k >Q
p
i −D
p
i )
+Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k >Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )]
+s[Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i )−Pr(D
p
i <Q
p
i ,D
p
j >Q
p
j ,D
p
k >Q
p
i −D
p
i )
−Pr(Dpi <Q
p
i ,D
p
j <Q
p
j ,D
p
k >Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )]− c.
(3.8)
The first term of Eq.(3.8) means that any additional inventory of product i will result in an
incremental sales except when there is excess inventory of product i (Dpi <Q
p
i ). The retailer can
still benefit from the marginal unit of product Qpi by satisfying the demand for the probabilistic
product (which may happen whenever the demand for product j can be satisfied), yielding p0.
The third term means that, if the inventory of product i exceeds its demand and the demand for
the probabilistic product can also be satisfied, the marginal unit of product i is only worth its
salvage value s. To simplify the notation, we re-arrange Eq.(3.8) and characterize the optimal
order quantities.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal order quantities (Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j ) under probabilistic selling can be
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expressed as  F(Q
p
i
∗) = p−c+(p0−s)G(Q
p∗
i ,Q
p∗
j )
p−s
F(Qp
∗
j ) =
p−c+(p0−s)N(Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j )
p−s ,
(3.9)
where
G(Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j )=
∫ Qp∗i
0
∫ Qp∗j
0
∫ ∞
Qp
∗
i +Qp
∗
j −Dpi −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ Qp∗i
0
∫ ∞
Qp
∗
j
∫ ∞
Qp
∗
i −Dpi
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk,
N(Qpi
∗,Qpj
∗)=
∫ Qp∗i
0
∫ Qp∗j
0
∫ ∞
Qp
∗
i +Qp
∗
j −Dpi −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qp∗j
0
∫ ∞
Qp
∗
j −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk.
We see that the optimal order quantities are adjustments of the solution for the newsvendor
model given in Eq.(3.1) and Eq.(3.2). Specifically, G(Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j ) raises Q
p
i due to the possibility of
substituting for the probabilistic product. Substitution occurs in two cases: one is the case where
product i has excess inventory while product j is out of stock, the other is the case where both
specific products i and j have excess inventory, while the probabilistic product is out of stock.
Similarly, N(Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j ) raises Q
p
j due to the substitution ability of product j. The implication of
this proposition is that the retailer should hold more inventory of the products that have greater
possibilities to substitute the other products. Thus the retailer can make incremental profit from
the substitute product.
Compared with inventory substitution, the inventory decision under probabilistic selling is
influenced by the price of the probabilistic product. Next, we analytically derive some properties
of the effect of p0 on the optimal inventory decision.
Proposition 3.3. When the price of the probabilistic product increases, the retailer should
adjust its inventory decision depending on the substitution possibility. Specifically,
a) The retailer should order more product j and less product i (
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
< 0, ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
> 0) if the
substitution possibility of product i is sufficiently small (G < b∗d∗ N).
b) The retailer should order more product i and less product j (
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
> 0, ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
< 0) if the
substitution possibility of product i is sufficiently large (G > a∗c∗ N).
c) The retailer should order more of both products i and j (
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
> 0, ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
> 0) if the
substitution possibility is moderate ( b
∗
d∗ N <G < a
∗
c∗ N),
where a∗, b∗, c∗, and d∗ denote the value of
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpi
,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
, and
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpj
at (Qpi
∗,Qpj
∗), respectively. Besides, a
∗
c∗ > 1 and b
∗
d∗ < 1.
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Proof. See the Appendix A.
In the classic single-product newsvendor model, the optimal inventory (i.e. Eq.(3.1) and
Eq.(3.2)) increases with the price. However, when it comes to the two-product setting of prob-
abilistic selling. How does the retailer adjust the optimal inventory decision when the price of
the probabilistic product increases? Proposition 3.3 states that, if there is an increase in the
price of the probabilistic product, the retailer should order more of one product and less of the
other when the difference of their substitution possibilities is large (e.g., G < b∗d∗ N, G > a
∗
c∗ N). And,
when the difference is not large, the retailer should increase the inventory of both products (e.g.,
b∗
d∗ N <G < a
∗
c∗ N). That means that the retailer should always order more product with higher sub-
stitution possibility. However, whether increase the inventory of product with lower substitution
possibility or not depends on the difference of the two product’s substitution possibility.
3.5 Comparisons for some special cases
Comparing the two strategies is difficult when the substitution fraction rs, and the canni-
balization indices ai and a j are non-zero. Therefore, we first compare the two strategies under
some special cases, and then conduct computational studies in the next part to compare the two
strategies in general. In practice, the cannibalization index a in probabilistic selling may become
zero when customers’ price sensitivity is low or product differentiation is very large (Granados
et al., 2010; Post and Spann, 2012). The substitution fraction rs may become zero when product
differentiation is very large.
Case 1: ai = a j = 0, Dk = 0 and rs=0. Inventory substitution is equivalent to probabilistic
selling as they have the same optimal order quantity and expected profit, and neither strategy
can improve the profit of the retailer.
This case may arises when the product differentiation is too large in a saturated market.
In this case, both inventory substitution and probabilistic selling fail to generate additional
profit from substitutable demand, and the introduction of low-priced products cannot attract new
demand in this market. Thus, both strategies reduce to the classical newsvendor model.
Case 2: ai = a j = 0, Dk 6= 0 and rs = 0. Probabilistic selling outperforms inventory substitution
as it yields a higher profit with a higher inventory level.
In this case, neither the customers in probabilistic selling nor in inventory substitution
accept a substitute when the product differentiation is too large. However, there are some
new customers enticed to buy discounted products under probabilistic selling. This case can
be explained by similar arguments in Post and Spann (2012), and Anderson (2009). Therefore,
inventory substitution reduces to the classical newsvendor model and probabilistic selling can
increase the profit by market expansion. However, the optimal inventory level under probabilistic
selling is higher than that under inventory substitution because both Qpi
∗> p−cp−s and Q
p
j
∗> p−cp−s
when G(Qp
∗
i ,Q
p∗
j )> 0 and N(Q
p∗
i ,Q
p∗
j )> 0.
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Case 3: ai = a j = 0, Dk 6= 0 and rs 6= 0. Inventory substitution requires more customers willing
to accept the substitute product than probabilistic selling to achieve the same profit at the same
marginal profit from the substitute product.
In this case, the comparison of the two strategies depends on the demand and marginal profit
obtained from the substitute product. When the size of the new market expansion demand under
probabilistic selling is the same as the number of customers that face a stock-out situation and
accept another product, the retailer has the same amount of discounted product sales under
the two selling strategies. However, probabilistic selling can increase the high-priced product
sales through substitution while inventory substitution cannot. Therefore, probabilistic selling
outperforms inventory substitution when it can attract an equal number of customers willing
to accept a substitute. Besides, because the retailer offers the probabilistic product in the first
selling stage rather than the second under inventory substitution, it has the potential to secure
more demand for the low-priced products.
3.6 Computational studies
In this section we consider a more general case where the cannibalization index ai = a j 6= 0
and rs 6= 0. The main question that drives the design of the computational studies is under what
conditions probabilistic selling outperforms inventory substitution, and vice versa. Specifically,
we explore the effects of the customer transfer coefficient and demand uncertainty on the optimal
profit and inventory under both strategies. The customer transfer coefficient is reflected by the
substitution fraction rs under inventory substitution and the cannibalization index ai(a j) under
probabilistic selling. The difference is that one is positive transfer induced by price and the other
is negative transfer forced by the stock-out of products.
We assume that the original demands D ti and D
t
j are equal, which are normally distributed
with parameters that satisfy the assumptions: mean ui(u j)= 100, standard deivation σi(σ j)=σ=
[20,30,40,50], the initial correlation coefficient ρ i j = 0, p= 40, c= 20, s= 10, ai = a j = a ∈ [0,1],
t= 2, and rs ∈ [0,1]. In order to focus on the substitution effect of the two strategies, we assume
that there is no new market expansion demand under probabilistic selling (e.g., Dk = 0 when the
original market is saturated). For simplicity, we use “PS” and “IS” to denote probabilistic selling
and inventory substitution, respectively.
3.6.1 The effect of the customer transfer coefficient
As shown in Fig. 3.4, with different price discounts (i.e., 95%, 90%, and 85%), the results reveal
the same trend that probabilistic selling achieves the highest expected profit at a relatively small
customer transfer coefficient, while the expected profit under inventory substitution increases
with the customer transfer coefficient. These two observations are consistent with the results in
Zhang et al. (2016) and Rajaram and Tang (2001), respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Expected profit of inventory substitution and probabilistic selling with different price
discounts.
The efficiency of demand substitution under probabilistic selling increases with a smaller
customer transfer coefficient (if the index is too small, the buffering effect of the probabilistic
product for demand substitution becomes insignificant), while being restricted at larger customer
transfer coefficient. One reason is that profit decreases with demand correlation when demand
is multivariate normal (Netessine and Rudi, 2003). It can be obtained from Eqs 3.5-3.6 that
the correlation between the newly revised demand would increase as more customers switch
from product i ( j) to k. The positively correlated demands of products i, j, and k result in high
possibilities of large and small substitution demands simultaneously. The probability that the
retailer substitutes specific products for the probabilistic product, or vice versa when stock-out
occurs is relatively small. Another reason is that more customers will switch to buying the
probabilistic product that yields a lower profit margin, which can harm the retailer’s profit. When
the profit that demand substitution brings cannot offset the lower sales of the specific products,
profit improvement will decrease. Therefore, probabilistic selling is most advantageous when the
customer transfer coefficient is large enough to enable substitution, but not so large that very
few consumers will buy the high-priced products.
As shown in Fig. 3.4, the expected profit under probabilistic selling with a fixed customer
transfer coefficient would decrease with price discount. This means that probabilistic selling
requires some customers that have high price sensitivity to be attracted by the product with a
small discount. Otherwise, when only few customers are attracted by a large discount, inventory
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substitution would be more advantageous than probabilistic selling.
3.6.2 Comparison of the expected profit
In this section we compare the performance of the two strategies when customers are price-
sensitive. We take the fixed discount 95% as an example and define PSe− ISe as the difference
in the optimal expected profit under the two strategies. A positive value means that probabilistic
selling is more advantageous; otherwise, inventory substitution strategy is more advantageous.
We draw a colour map as shown in Fig. 3.5 to facilitate analysis of strategy selection. We colour a
positive value in red and a negative one in blue. From the computational results, we make the
following observations:
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.5: Expected profit comparison with respect to different initial demand uncertainty
Observation 3.1: With a relatively small customer transfer coefficient under probabilistic
selling and inventory substitution, the former is more profitable. Inventory substitution out-
performs probabilistic selling when the transfer coefficients under the two strategies are very
high.
Observation 3.2: Probabilistic selling is more advantageous than inventory substitution at
higher demand uncertainty.
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From Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5, we see that probabilistic selling can greatly improve profit with
a smaller customer transfer coefficient than inventory substitution. For example, probabilistic
selling can achieve a higher profit with a= 0.1 when σ=20, while inventory substitution requires
rs = 0.4 to achieve the same profit. When σ=30, probabilistic selling can achieve a higher profit
with a= 0.2, while inventory substitution requires rs = 0.5. However, when the customer transfer
coefficient is larger, the advantage of probabilistic selling diminishes while inventory substitution
can still bring more profit to the retailer. The customer transfer coefficient a under probabilistic
selling mainly depends on customers’ price sensitivity and product differentiation. Probabilistic
selling requires that some customers are sensitive to price to be attracted to buy the probabilistic
product (Zhang et al., 2016; Fay and Xie, 2008). At the same time, product differentiation should
be large enough to avoid too much transfer (Post, 2010). Inventory substitution mainly depends
on product differentiation. And the more customers that will accept another product are, the
more sales the retailer can get in the second selling stage.
Therefore, lower product differentiation is necessary for inventory substitution to be advan-
tageous. Just as shown in Fig. 3.5, when product differentiation is very low, and the customer
transfer coefficient a and rs are high, inventory substitution can bring more profit to the retailer.
Therefore, the implication for the retailer is as follows: Adopting a proper selling strategy to
manage demand uncertainty depends on customer characteristics and product differentiation. If
the specific products have great similarity, inventory substitution is more advantageous, while
relatively lower product similarity and higher price-sensitive customers can bring more profit
to the retailer that adopts probabilistic selling. This observation is consistent with reality that
probabilistic selling is common in third-party intermediary platforms which sells various products
from different vendors, e.g., a seller may use inventory substitution to sell double-bed rooms and
twin-bed rooms in one specific hotel, and may use probabilistic selling to sell rooms belonging to
different hotels (e.g., Hotwire.com).
Observation 3.2 is obvious. The red-coloured area increases with demand uncertainty. The
application range for adopting probabilistic selling is much wider when demand uncertainty is
larger. Therefore, probabilistic selling is a more promising strategy to combat demand uncertainty.
3.6.3 Comparison of the optimal inventory decision
We define PSv− ISv as the difference between the optimal total inventory under the two strate-
gies. A negative value means that the retailer would hold less inventory when implementing
probabilistic selling. We draw a colour map as shown in Fig. 3.6, in which we colour the pos-
itive values in red and the negative values in blue. From the results, we make the following
observation.
Observation 3.3: Probabilistic selling is more advantageous than inventory substitution in
reducing inventory under most circumstances.
As shown in Fig. 3.6, the blue-coloured area is very large. The inventory level under proba-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.6: Optimal inventory comparison with respect to different initial demand uncertainty
bilistic selling is usually lower than that under inventory substitution. Combined with Fig. 3.5,
we find that when probabilistic selling outperforms inventory substitution in terms of yielding a
higher profit, its optimal inventory is always lower than that under inventory substitution. The
only exception is when a= 0.1 and rs = 0.3 with σ=50. In contrast, when inventory substitution
is more profitable, its optimal inventory is usually higher than that under probabilistic selling.
Therefore, if it is optimal for the retailer to adopt probabilistic selling in a specific environment,
it can usually obtain a higher profit with lower inventory than inventory substitution.
3.7 Conclusions
By offering the low priced probabilistic product to induce some customers to buy a flexible
product, the retailer can substitute demand when stock out occurs to hedge against the demand
uncertainty. Both probabilistic selling and inventory substitution strategy share the common
feature in combating demand uncertainty through demand substitution. Therefore, our study
focuses on analyzing and comparing the efficiency of the two strategies. In this chapter we
first develop a single-period newsvendor model with three products to analyze probabilistic
selling with a view to generating insights into using probabilistic selling to manage demand
uncertainty. We then compare probabilistic selling with inventory substitution in the special
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cases without cannibalization. To gain additional insights into the normal situation, we use
computational examples to compare the two strategies in terms of overall profit and inventory
with considerations of customer transition and demand uncertainty.
While both inventory substitution and probabilistic selling can induce demand from product-
insensitive customers to achieve demand substitution, they differ in that probabilistic selling
allows customers to accept uncertainty voluntarily at a discounted price rather than forcing
them to accept another product like that under inventory substitution. The computational results
show that probabilistic selling will bring more profit to the retailer when selling products with
relatively lower similarity to higher price-sensitive customers, and it is more profitable to use
inventory substitution to sell products with high similarity. Besides, higher demand uncertainty
increases the profitability of probabilistic selling over inventory substitution.
The research of exploring the inventory mechanism of probabilistic selling compared with
inventory substitution has theoretical and practical significance. The study enriches the research
about probabilistic selling as an inventory management tool to combat demand uncertainty.
According to the conclusions of this manuscript, the retailer can choose the efficient strategy
considering product differentiation, customer characteristics, and level of demand uncertainty.
This has significant practical implications for the retailer that sells multiple products as follows:
First, under probabilistic selling, the retailer should not be afraid of cannibalization because a
proper degree of cannibalization can benefit the retailer in terms of yielding a higher expected
profit. When the price of the probabilistic product increases, the retailer should always order
more inventory of the product with higher substitution possibility. Second, if the retailer sells
the substitute product with lower product similarity to price-sensitive customers, it is advised
to use probabilistic selling to achieve a higher profit, and order less inventory than inventory
substitution in most cases. On the other hand, inventory substitution is the better choice for the
retailer when the product similarity is higher.
We assume in this study that the price of the probabilistic product is an exogenous variable.
Future research may extend our work by combining the pricing and inventory decisions. It is also
worth considering PS in a supply chain setting (Shen et al., 2017; Minner, 2003). For example, it
is interesting to explore the conditions under which a retailer’s probabilistic selling will benefit
the supplier, the retailer, and both.
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INVENTORY DECISION OF PROBABILISTIC SELLING WITH
PRICE-DEPENDENT DEMAND RESHAPE
4.1 Introduction
When the retailer offers probabilistic goods, the retailer usually charges a lower price for the
probabilistic products than their source products. According to Meredith and Maki, a low-priced
brand would cannibalize sales of a higher-priced brand (upward cannibalization) with enough
price gap between the two brands (Meredith and Maki, 2001). Therefore, the price gap between
the specific product and probabilistic product would reshape the demand, i.e., demand for specific
products switch to the probabilistic product. And it is necessary to consider the price-dependent
demand reshape in probabilistic selling.
Therefore, this chapter analyzes the effect of probabilistic selling on inventory management
through demand substitution and price-dependent demand reshape. The study of this chapter is
based on Chapter 3. And the difference of this chapter is: In order to concentrate on the effect
of probabilistic selling on inventory management, we ignore the increased demand due to the
offer of the lower-priced products, i.e.,the demand for the probabilistic products comes from the
switched demand. Furthermore, we assume that the demand switch is mainly determined by the
price discount for the probabilistic product(Meredith and Maki, 2001; Eynan and Fouque, 2003).
It is notable that the extant studies on demand reshape rarely consider the switching cost
(Eynan and Fouque, 2003, 2005). However, the demand switch in probabilistic selling is cost, i.e.,
price discount, driven. Therefore, we employ a switch pattern similar to Eynan and Fouque (2005)
but consider the switching cost. Moreover, the switching rate is determined by the switching cost,
i.e., the price gap between the probabilistic product and the specific products.
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The main purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of probabilistic selling on inventory
management through demand substitution and price-dependent demand reshape. We construct a
newsvendor-type model to characterize the price-dependent demand substitution pattern. We
perform a simulation study to extensively explore the effects of demand uncertainty, demand
correlation, price sensitivity, and price discount on inventory decisions and profitability of prob-
abilistic selling. The results show that probabilistic selling can benefit the seller with higher
expected profit and lower inventory by reducing demand uncertainty and improving inven-
tory efficiency, even without considering the increased demand due to offering the low-priced
probabilistic product. Moreover, the effect of probabilistic selling is more significant with lower
product differentiation, higher customers’ price sensitivity, and higher demand uncertainty. It is
noted that the optimal selection of the price discount is necessary to secure good performance of
probabilistic selling, given that improper pricing will undermine seller’s profit.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Definitions and assumptions
We consider the scenario where an online retailer of two homogeneous products, i and j, creates
the virtual probabilistic product k, and sells i, j, and k simultaneously. In probabilistic selling,
the specific products i and j achieve substitution through the probabilistic products k instead of
being direct substitutes for each other. The event sequence of probabilistic selling is as follows:
First, the retailer purchases a quantity Qpi of product i and a quantity Q
p
j of product j. Second, it
announces the prices of the specific products and the price discount of the probabilistic product.
All the demands for the products arrive at the same time. Then the retailer would substitute
the available products for the stock-out products. The substitution policy is that the demands
for specific products i and j have priority to be satisfied. The retailer aims to make the optimal
inventory decisions with different price discounts.
We use the following notation throughout this chapter:
p: the selling price of two specific products i and j,
r: discount of the regular price p (i.e., the probabilistic product k would be sold at price (1− r)p,
λ: price sensitivity level of customers (the customers with higher price sensitivity are more likely
to switch from purchasing specific products to the probabilistic product),
α: the rate of customers switching from the specific products i and j to the k,
c: purchasing cost of the products,
v: salvage cost of the products i, j and k,
q: penalty cost of the products i, j and k,
D i:distribution of the original demand for the specific product i, D i ∼ (ui,σi),
D j:distribution of the original demand for the specific product j, D j ∼ (u j,σ j),
Dpi : stochastic demand of product i when offering the probabilistic product,
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Dpj : stochastic demand of product j when offering the probabilistic product,
uk:mean of the demand for the probabilistic product k,
σk: standard deviation of the demand for the probabilistic product k,
ρ i j: the correlation coefficient of the original demands for products i and j,
f (x, y):the joint distribution function of the original demands for specific products i and j.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the demands for specific products follow the normal
distribution. The retailer gives a discount of r to induce some customers to buy the probabilistic
product. When introducing the discounted probabilistic product, α per cent of the customers
who originally intend to buy specific products would switch to buy the probabilistic product k.
The switch rate α is related to two key elements, namely the price gap and the level of product
differentiation (Meredith and Maki, 2001). Therefore, give two certain specific products, we define
the switch rate as
α=λr, (4.1)
where λ is the price sensitivity level of the customers. The discount rate r satisfies 0≤ r <
1− c/p to make sure that the price of the probabilistic product is higher than the cost c. Eq.(4.1)
implies that the switch rate is positively related to the discount r when λ> 0. When r = 0, the
probabilistic selling problem degenerates into the classic newsvendor problem without demand
substitution and into the centralized inventory strategy when r = 1.
4.2.2 Model
We assume that the total demand for the probabilistic product comes from demand for the specific
source products. Thus, the original demands for the two specific products i and j would be
reshaped under probabilistic selling as follows:
Dpi = (1−α)D i,
Dpj = (1−α)D j.
(4.2)
The demand distribution of the probabilistic product can be expressed as
Dpk = αD i+αD j. (4.3)
The expected profit in Eq.(4.4) includes the revenue, the salvage cost, the penalty cost, and the
acquisition cost as follows:
E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
=E

pmin
(
Dpi ,Q
p
i
)+ pmin(Dpj ,Qpj )
+ (1−λr) pmin
[
Dpk ,
[(
Qpi −D
p
i
)++ (Qpj −Dpj )+]]
+s
[(
Qpi −D
p
i
)++ (Qpj −Dpj )+−Dpk]− c (Qpi +Qpj )
−q
[(
Dpi −Q
p
i
)++ (Dpj −Qpj )+− (Dpk − (Qpi −Dpi )+− (Qpj −Dpj )+)+]
(4.4)
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The demands for the products vary over the domain D i ≥ 0 and D j ≥ 0. With a given switch
rate α, the expected profit E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
depends on the relationship between α and the optimal
order sizes Qpi and Q
p
j . Therefore, the expected profit can be calculated in four different cases,
i.e., Case I:αQpi +αQ
p
j ≤Q
p
i and αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≤Q
p
j ; Case II: αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≤Q
p
i and αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≥Q
p
j ;
Case III:αQpi +αQ
p
j ≥Q
p
i and αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≤Q
p
j ; Case IV: αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≥Q
p
i and αQ
p
i +αQ
p
j ≥Q
p
j ,
as shown in Fig. 4.1.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.1: The four cases of the expected profit.
Considering the spirit of modelling the expected profit is the same as those in the above
four cases, we just present in this section the details of case IV for conciseness. The expected
profit functions in the other three cases can be formulated in the same way. Analysis of Case IV
proceeds as follows:
(1)Under the condition of
{
Q i ≥ (1−α)D i,Q j ≥ (1−α)D j,Q i+Q j−D i−D j ≥ 0
}
, the proba-
bilistic product is out of stock. However, the generated substitute demand for product i (or
product j) can be met from stock. The expected profit function is
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
[
p (1−α) x+ p (1−α) y+ (1− r) p (αx+αy)+ s
(
Qpi +Q
p
j − x− y
)
− c
(
Qpi +Q
p
j
)]
f (x, y)dxdy
(2)Under the condition of
{
Q i ≥ (1−α)D i,Q j ≥ (1−α)D j,Q i+Q j−D i−D j ≤ 0
}
, the proba-
bilistic product is stock out. Only part of the substitute demand can be met from the remaining
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inventory of products i and j. The relevant expected profit function is
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
∫ Q pj
1−α
Qpi +Qpj −x
[
p (1−α) x+ p (1−α) y+ (1− r) p
(
Qpi +Q
p
j − (1−α) x− (1−α) y
)
− q
(
x+ y−Qpi −Q
p
j
)
− c
(
Qpi +Q
p
j
)]
f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Q pi
1−α
Qpi +Qpj
∫ Q pj
1−α
0
[
p (1−α) x+ p (1−α) y+ (1− r) p
(
Qpi +Q
p
j − (1−α) x− (1−α) y
)
− q
(
x+ y−Qpi −Q
p
j
)
− c
(
Qpi +Q
p
j
)]
f (x, y)dxdy
(3)Under the condition of
{
Q i ≤ (1−α)D i,Q j ≥ (1−α)D j,Q j− (1−α)D j ≤αD i+αD j
}
, both
the probabilistic product and specific product i are stock out. Furthermore, only part of the
substitute demand can be met from the remaining inventory of product j. The relevant expected
profit function is
∫ ∞
Q pi
1−α
∫ Q pj
1−α
0
[
pQpi + p (1−α) y+ (1− r) p
[
Qpj − (1−α) y
]
− q
(
x+ y−Qpi −Q
p
j
)
− c
(
Qpi +Q
p
j
)]
f (x, y)dxdy
(4)Under the condition of
{
Q i ≤ (1−α)D i,Q j ≤ (1−α)D j
}
, both specific products i and j are
stock out. None of the substitute demand can be met. The relevant expected profit function is
∫ ∞
Q pi
1−α
∫ ∞
Q pj
1−α
[
pQpi + pQ
p
j − q
(
x+ y−Qpi −Q
p
j
)
− c
(
Qpi +Q
p
j
)]
f (x, y)dxdy
(5) Under the condition of
{
Q i ≥ (1−α)D i,Q j ≤ (1−α)D j,Q i− (1−α)D i ≤αD i+αD j
}
, both
the probabilistic product and specific product j are stock out. Furthermore, only part of the
substitute demand can be met from the remaining inventory of product i. The relevant expected
profit function for this part is
∫ Q pi
1−α
0
∫ ∞
Q pj
1−α
[
p (1−α) x+ pQpj + (1− r) p
[
Qpi − (1−α) x
]− q (x+ y−Qpi −Qpj )− c (Qpi +Qpj )] f (x, y)dxdy
By calculating the Hessian matrices in the four cases, we can show that the expected function
E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
is concave with respect to (Qpi ,Q
p
j ) (Proof. See the Appendix B). However, we cannot
derive closed-form solutions due to the high complexity of the expected profit function, which
prevents us from investigating the relationships among different variables of interest. Fortunately,
the expected profit function is concave, so we can search for the optimal solution using a numerical
simulation approach.
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4.3 Simulation insights on inventory and profit performance
4.3.1 Simulation design
This simulation aims to obtain insights into the inventory and profit performance in probabilistic
selling by addressing the following two questions: (1) What is the performance of probabilistic
selling in terms of total inventory level and expected profit compared with that of the classic
newsvendor model? (2) What is the effect of demand uncertainty, demand correlation, price
discount, and price sensitivity on the profitability of probabilistic selling?
Consistent with the above assumptions, we set the parameter values for the simulation
studies as follows: ui = u j = 1200, p = 40, c = 10, s = 0, q = 4,σ = σ1 = σ2 = 400,500,600,ρ i j =
−0.5,0,0.5, r ∈ [0,0.75], and λ ∈ [0,4/3] 1. With different parameter combinations, we use the
Mathematica to search for the optimal orders of products i and j (Qpi and Q
p
j ), and the corre-
sponding expected profit E(Qpi ,Q
p
j ). Then we calculate the profit increase PI =
E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )−E(Q ti ,Q tj)
E(Q ti ,Q
t
j)
and inventory decrease DI = (Q
t
i+Q tj)−(Qpi +Qpj )
Q ti+Q tj
with respect to those of the classical newsvendor
model, where Q ti and Q
t
j denote the optimal orders of products i and j in the classical newsvendor
model, respectively.
4.3.2 Simulation analysis
(1) Effects of price discount and demand uncertainty
Figure 4.2: The effects of price discount and demand uncertainty on inventory level
1The switch rate becomes 1 When the customer price sensitivity is larger than 4/3. Then all the customers will
buy the probabilistic product, which will not affect optimal inventory level anymore but decrease the expected profit
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Figure 4.3: The effects of price discount and demand uncertainty on the expected profit
As shown in Fig. 4.2, the inventory level decreases with price discount. This pattern can
be explained from two aspects. On the one hand, the increasing price discount induces more
customers who intended to buy the two different specific products to buy single species of
probabilistic product, which reshapes the demand distribution. Consequently, the aggregate
demand uncertainty would decreases with the switching amount (Eynan and Fouque, 2003).
Besides, the demand substitution also contributes to inventory decrease. Because with nonzero
price discount, the demand of probabilistic product become a pool for substitution when stock-out
occurs, which also helps to reduce demand uncertainty. However, on the other hand, the retailer
would sell more of the lower-priced probabilistic product to customers with increasing price
discount. Consequently, this phenomenon leads to a trade-off between the benefits of decreased
inventory and profit decrease resulting from more low-priced customers. Therefore, the curves in
Fig. 4.3 show that the expected profit increases with price discount first and then decreases with
it. With lower price discounts between 0 and 0.2, probabilistic selling can benefit the retailer
with higher profit and lower inventory. However, with larger price discounts, the benefit of
lower inventory would not offset the profit decrease due to lower prices, resulting in a rapid
decline. Another observation from Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 is that the efficiency of probabilistic selling
would increase with respect to higher demand uncertainty. As demand reshape and demand
substitution would benefit the retailer with reduced demand uncertainty, there will be more room
for improvement through probabilistic selling.
(2) Effects of customer price sensitivity and price discount
As shown in Fig. 4.4, when the customers’ price sensitivity is higher, the retailer can achieve
higher profit increases with the optimal price discount. This is logical because with higher
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Figure 4.4: The effects of price sensitivity on the expected profit
Figure 4.5: The effects of price sensitivity on the inventory level
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customers’ price sensitivity, there would be more demand switch, even though the retailer offers
a small price discount. In other words, the retailer will benefit more from the smaller “price
sacrifice”. The curves in Fig. 4.5 share the same logic that the retailer can always get higher
inventory decrease with higher customer price sensitivity. When the switch rate approaches
1, we can expect that probabilistic selling reduces to centralized inventory and the inventory
levels would be the same. We can also interpret the observation from the perspective of product
differentiation. It is reasonable that lower product differentiation leads to higher price sensitivity
with some certain price discount. And according to the observation that higher price sensitivity
can benefit the retailer with higher profit, we can conclude that the retailer has the potential to
gain more profit by offering products with weaker product differentiation at the optimal price
discount.
(3) Effects of demand correlation and price discount
Figure 4.6: The effects of demand correlation on the expected profit
From Fig. 4.6 we can see that the expected profit decreases with demand correlation, which is
consistent with Netessine and Rudi (2003). As for the aspect of demand reshape, lower demand
correlation results in lower demand uncertainty. As for the aspect of demand substitution, posi-
tively correlated demands of products i and j result in simultaneous large or small substitution
demands with a high possibility. That means that the probability that the retailer substitutes
specific products for the probabilistic product occurs is low. Therefore, the negative correlation
will result in higher expected profit.
However, the price profit gap becomes small when the price discount is very large. The possible
reason is that when price discount is large, the demand for the specific products is small while the
demand for the probabilistic product is large. Then the substitution demand from the customers
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Figure 4.7: The effects of demand correlation on the expected profit
who buy specific products is small, which reduces the effect of demand substitution. Similarly,
the optimal inventory level with smaller demand correlation is lower, while becomes higher
when the price discount is very large. The reason is that the benefit from demand substitution
would diminish when the price discount become larger. Meanwhile, the substitution probability is
larger when demand correlation is negative, which increases optimal inventory (e.g., the optimal
inventory increases with its substitution probability). Therefore, the inventory level with lower
demand correlation maybe higher than the inventory level with higher demand correlation.
4.4 Conclusions
To investigate the effects of probabilistic selling on inventory decisions and expected profit
through demand reshape and demand substitution, we first analyse the demand reshape and
substitution patterns under probabilistic selling and propose a single-period newsvendor model
with stochastic demands for multiple products. Subsequently, we perform a simulation experiment
to figure out the effects of price discount, customer price sensitivity, demand uncertainty, and
demand correlation on the retailer’s optimal inventory level and expected profit. The results show
that probabilistic selling can benefit the seller with higher expected profit and lower inventory by
reducing demand uncertainty and improving inventory efficiency, even without considering the
increased demand due to offering the low-priced probabilistic product. Besides, the efficiency of
probabilistic selling with respect to managing inventory is closely dependent on customers’ price
sensitivity or product differentiation, demand uncertainty, and the demand correlation. Moreover,
the effect of probabilistic selling is more significant with lower product differentiation, higher
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customers’ price sensitivity, and higher demand uncertainty. It is noted that the optimal selection
of the price discount is necessary to secure good performance of probabilistic selling, given that
unsuitable values of lead to lower expected profits in our simulation.
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INVENTORY-PRICING POLICY IN “PHYSICAL” PROBABILISTIC
SELLING
5.1 Introduction
In the retailing industry, retailers can attract customers by providing mystery products (e.g.,
some product information is unknown to customers until they place the orders). For example,
the mystery sealed “lucky bags” of discounted products (called Fukubukuro) are very popular in
Japan during the new year holiday. These lucky bags come in all shapes and sizes with various
themes ranging from clothes, accessories, toys, cosmetics etc. Customers do not know what is
exactly inside the bag until they buy and open them. Every year, customers in Japan and overseas
fans are attracted by the random surprise and discount from the lucky bags. Another example is
Ferrero that proffers the Kinder Joy or Kinder Surprise eggs containing random toys. Ferrero
reported that the good performance of its range of Kinder products helped it achieve a 14%
increase in annual pretax profit after sales in 2014 (Abdulla, 2015). Chocolate company Zaini
also produces similar mystery chocolate toys. Yet another example is the toys proffered in a
gashapon machine or an opaque box, which can be found in shopping stores or online websites,
e.g., Taobao.com, Amazon.com, ToyWiz.com etc. Fig. 5.1 provides a specific example of an online
retailer selling toys packaged in an opaque box (referred to as mystery products). A customer
buying such an opaque product has a chance to get one of the component cartoon figures printed
on the box. If the customer does not accept uncertainty, they may pay a higher price for a specific
product packed in a transparent box.
Except for the benefit of demand expansion due to customer curiosity, it is a significant
1Source of the specific product: https://item.taobao.com. The figure of the probabilistic product was taken in a
retail store in Japan.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: An example. 1
issue to ascertain the operational benefits to retailers of offering such mystery products. Besides,
when offering the specific and mystery products simultaneously, how should the retailer set its
inventory-pricing policy? Specifically, we address the following questions in this chapter: What is
the optimal price discount for the mystery product that yields the maximum profit to the retailer?
How should the retailer allocate inventory between the specific and mystery products? What are
the impacts of the key factors such as demand variability, customer price sensitivity, and product
differentiation on the optimal outcomes? And, how does supply uncertainty affect the retailer’s
performance?
The selling strategy that offers mystery products can be regarded as a special form of
probabilistic selling (PS). Fay and Xie (2008) defined PS as the selling strategy under which
the retailer selling multiple products creates an additional “virtual” probabilistic product by
hiding some product information to be sold at a discount. However, differing from the probability
product in Fay and Xie (2008), ours is a discounted physical probabilistic product (PPP) that can
also be bought in bricks-and-mortar shops rather than merely a “virtual” product bought online.
To differentiate our work from Fay and Xie (2008), we refer to the PS strategy under study as
“physical probabilistic selling” (PPS).
Related research has demonstrated that the offer of a lower-priced probabilistic product
enables the retailer to segment the market (Shapiro and Shi, 2008; Fay and Xie, 2008) and
increase the product category range to satisfy customers’ personalized needs, which facilitate
differential pricing to increase market size and profit (Anupindi and Jiang, 2008; Fay and Xie,
2008). Some operational studies also have explored the benefits of adopting PS for inventory
management through postponing the delivery of the probabilistic product (Petrick et al., 2012;
Gönsch and Steinhardt, 2013; Gallego and Phillips, 2004; Wu and Wu, 2015), dynamic allocation
depending on inventory (Elmachtoub and Wei, 2015), or demand substitution (Zhang et al., 2016).
However, the above literature considers “virtual” probabilistic products rather than physical ones.
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In addition, the benefits for inventory management are not applicable under PPS. In our setting,
the customer that buys the PPP will get the product immediately and the retailer cannot benefit
from PPS through demand postponement or dynamic allocation. In other words, the retailer
has to make the pricing and inventory allocation decisions in advance. The benefits of demand
postponement and dynamic allocation from selling “virtual” probabilistic products do not exist
and the motivation for adopting PPS is unclear.
In this study we consider a retailer ordering two specific products from a upstream supplier
has the choice to allocate some inventory as a discounted PPP. All the demand for the PPP comes
from the stochastic demand for the specific products, depending on the price discount and product
differentiation. We construct a model to derive the retailer’s optimal price-inventory decisions to
maximize its expected profit. We then compare PPS with traditional selling (TS) with respect
to expected profit and optimal inventory. Finally, we perform numerical studies to investigate
the effect of supply risk on PPS. To address the research questions, we follow the approaches of
Eynan and Fouque (2003), and Hsieh (2011) for modelling and analysis.
Our main result is that PPS can help alleviate both demand and supply uncertainty risks.
First, we find that PPS can pool the uncertainty risk through demand reshape. Under PPS,
the price gap that exists between the specific product and the PPP causes demand reshape,
i.e., the demand for the specific product switches to the demand for the PPP. The practice of
demand reshape through offering a low-priced PPP affects the retailer’s profits in two ways.
On the one hand, the aggregate demand uncertainty will be reduced. On the other hand, the
revenue will decrease due to the product switch. We show that the retailer can improve its
profit while decreasing its inventory with an optimal price discount for the PPP. The larger the
demand uncertainty is, the larger discount the retailer needs to offer to induce more demand
switch to pool the demand risk. In addition, we find that the advantage of PS is decreasing
in product differentiation and increasing in customer price sensitivity. Second, PPS can even
be more advantageous due to its inventory allocation flexibility when the supply is subject to
asymmetrical uncertainty risk.
We make four contributions in this study. 1) Considering PS, we are the first to explore the
profitability and pricing-inventory policy of the retailer that offers the PPP. 2) We analytically
examine the risk-pooling effect of PPS through demand reshape. 3) We find the risk diversification
effect of PPS that helps alleviate asymmetrical supply risk through numerical studies. 4) In terms
of demand reshape, we establish that PPS is a special application of the demand switch induced
by price discount in real practice. Our research findings and their management implications
help practitioners gain more insight on the risk-pooling effect of PPS and facilitate their pricing-
inventory related decision-making.
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5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Probabilistic selling
Our work differs from this stream of literature by exploring the benefits of PS when the retailer
offers a PPP rather than merely a virtual choice. Given that the retailer cannot reap the benefits
postponement and dynamic allocation by offering the PPP, we analytically examine the benefit of
PPS for managing demand uncertainty through demand reshape. In addition, we also evaluate
by numerical studies the performance of PPS in alleviating supply uncertainty through inventory
flexibility.
5.2.2 Demand reshape
Our model also considers the three-product scenario similar to the “merge-switching” pattern in
Hsieh (2011), whereby a firm selling multiple products (e.g., A, B, and C) convinces customers
that originally purchase products A and B to switch to purchasing product C without cost. The
demand switching pattern under PPS in our study is different from his as follows: 1) There are
two kinds of product under PPS, namely products A and B, while product C is a PPP that may
become product A or B. 2) Demand switching in his research is driven by advertising rather
than the price gap under PPS (Meredith and Maki, 2001). Therefore, we have to characterize the
relationship between the price discount and switch rate, and then analytically derive both the
price and inventory allocation decisions.
5.2.3 Risk management strategies
Managing inventory is difficult due to risk, which is usually subject to prevalent demand or
supply uncertainty, and firms can adopt a number of strategies to manage the corresponding risk.
In the single-product system, firms can consider adopting the strategies of centralized inven-
tory, transshipment, or postponement to combat demand uncertainty. Centralized inventory is
used by a firm that sells the same product at multiple locations, whereby it consolidates inventory
in one single warehouse. Pooling inventory allows a firm to take advantage of random fluctuations
in demand (Eppen, 1979; Snyder and Shen, 2011). The transshipment strategy is used by a firm
to re-distribute inventory of the same echelon among multiple locations (Dong and Rudi, 2004;
Tai and Ching, 2014; Dehghani and Abbasi, 2018). Postponement benefits a firm by delaying its
operational activities (e.g., production and delivery of products) in the supply chain until the firm
receives more information about the demand (Aviv and Federgruen, 2001; Tang, 2011; Anand
and Girotra, 2007; Anupindi and Jiang, 2008). For a review of the research on transhipment and
postponement, the reader may refer to Paterson et al. (2011) and Van Hoek (2001).
In a multi-product system, strategies such as component commonality, inventory substitution,
and demand reshape are usually considered to combat risk. Component commonality means
that a firm that manufactures different end products can decrease inventory and manufacturing
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cost by improving component part standardization (Collier, 1981, 1982; Gerchak et al., 1988).
Inventory substitution is used to persuade the customer to buy a substitute when their required
product is out of stock (Parlar, 1988; Bassok et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015).
Eynan and Fouque (2003), and Hsieh (2011) explored the risk polling effect of “demand reshape”
by encouraging the customer to switch to buying another product. The difference between demand
reshape and inventory substitution is that the former is a voluntary switch while the latter is a
forced switch when stock-out occurs (Eynan and Fouque, 2003).
Supply uncertainty has also been widely studied mainly in two forms, i.e., supply disruption
and yield uncertainty. Supply disruption means that the supply may be halted due to natural
disasters, political events, social threats etc. Yield uncertainty usually means that the delivery
quantity of the supplier is random. Regarding the strategies to combat supply uncertainty, Tomlin
(2006) pointed out that in the single-product setting, faced with supply uncertainty, a firm can
consider increasing the inventory level, souring from more reliable suppliers (Parlar and Wang,
1993; Wang et al., 2010; Tang and Kouvelis, 2011; Giri, 2011), or just accepting the risk passively.
Schmitt et al. (2015), and Atan and Snyder (2012) showed that decentralized inventory design,
i.e., stocking inventory at multiple locations, can help the firm reduce cost variance by risk
diversification. Schmitt et al. (2015) also pointed out that centralization is optimal when supply
is deterministic and demand is stochastic due to the risk-pooling effect.
The majority of the literature explores the use of a strategy into combat either demand
uncertainty by risk pooling or supply uncertainty by risk diversification. In contrast, we study
the advantage of PPS as a strategy to combat both demand and yield uncertainty. Specifically, we
focus on the performance of PPS in terms of its risk-pooling effect, i.e., demand reshape by price
discount, and risk-diversification ability ,i.e., inventory flexibility by offering PPP.
5.3 Model
5.3.1 Definitions and assumptions
1) Definitions
p: the selling price of two specific products i and j,
r: the PPP k is sold at a discount r, where 0< r ≤ 1, so the price of the PPP is (1− r)p,
α: the rate of customers switching from the specific products i and j to the PPP k,
d: level of product differentiation between the two specific products,
λ: the sensitivity of the switch rate to r/d,
c: purchasing cost of the products,
v: salvage cost of the products i, j and k,
q: penalty cost of the products i, j and k,
D i:distribution of the original demand for the specific product i, D i ∼ (ui,σi),
D j:distribution of the original demand for the specific product j, D j ∼ (u j,σ j),
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D˜ i:distribution of the demand for the specific product i after demand reshape, D˜ i ∼ (u˜i, σ˜i),
D˜ j:distribution of the demand for the specific product j after demand reshape, D˜ j ∼ (u˜ j, σ˜ j),
uk:mean of the demand for the PPP k,
σk: standard deviation of the demand for the PPP k,
ρ i j: the correlation coefficient of the original demands for products i and j,
X ,Y , Z: the demands for the specific products i and j, and the PPP k, respectively,
f˜ (x, y, z): the joint distribution function of the demand for the specific and probabilistic products
after demand reshape,
Qpi ,Q
p
j , Q
p
k : the inventory for the specific products i, j, and the PPP k, respectively,
Q ti,Q
t
j: the inventory for the specific products i and j respectively, under TS,
Q∗pps,Q∗ts: the optimal total inventory under PPS and TS, respectively,
φpps, φts: the expected profit under PPS and TS, respectively.
2) Assumptions
a) We make the usual assumption that p> c> v to make the analysis meaningful.
b) We assume that the price of the specific products p is exogenous, which is determined by the
market.
c) The retailer orders the products from a upstream supplier and has the ability to package them.
In order to focus on the demand reshape effect, we ignore the package cost in our study.
d) We assume that the retailer cannot open the package to substitute the PPP for the specific
products, or vice versa2. All the unsold products will be disposed of at the salvage cost.
e) The customer who faces a stock out will leave the market rather than choosing a substitute
product.
5.3.2 Model
The retailer creates the PPP using the existing specific products and gives a discount of r to induce
some customers to buy the PPP. Given the discounted PPP, a fraction α of the customers who
originally intend to buy specific products will switch to buying the PPP. The value of α depends
on two key elements, namely the price gap between the specific and probabilistic products, and
the level of product differentiation (Anderson, 2009; Post, 2010). Therefore, we define
α=
λr/d if 0< r6 d/λ1 if r > d/λ (5.1)
where 0<α≤ 1. d (d0 <d< 1) measures the level of product differentiation. The lowest product
differentiation d0 ensures that the assumption about the original demand distributions for the
two specific products is reasonable 3. A smaller d denotes small differentiation between the two
2This is reasonable for the operation costs (e.g., the machine setup cost and labour cost to check the product
information or to re-package the product).
3When product differentiation is very small, i.e., the extreme case when d = 0 and the two products reduced to one
single product, the retailer may lose some customers due to lower product variety.
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specific products (e.g., two T-shirts in different colours have smaller differentiation than those
made of different materials). λ (λ > 0) denotes the sensitivity of the switch rate, i.e., from a
specific product to the PPP k, to r/d 4. A larger λ means that the customers are more sensitive to
price, and a smaller λ means that the customers are more sensitive to product differentiation. It
is evident from Eq.(5.1) that the switch rate increases with the discount rate and decreases with
product differentiation. When λ is large enough to make λr/d > 1, then all the customers buying
the specific products will switch to buying the PPP, for which we define α= 1. Thus, the original
demands for the specific products i and j are as follows:
u˜i = (1−α)ui,
u˜ j = (1−α)u j,
σ˜i = (1−α)σi,
σ˜ j = (1−α)σ j.
(5.2)
It follows that the mean and standard deviation of the demand distribution of the PPP are,
respectively, as follows:
uk = aui+au j,
σk = α
√
σi2+σ j2+2ρ i jσiσ j .
(5.3)
With the discount rate 0< r ≤ 1, we can divide the demand scenario into eight cases as follows:
1)X ≤ Qpi ,Y ≤ Q
p
j , Z ≤ Q
p
k ;2)X > Q
p
i ,Y ≤ Q
p
j , Z ≤ Q
p
k ;3)X ≤ Q
p
i ,Y > Q
p
j , Z ≤ Q
p
k ;4)X ≤ Q
p
i ,Y ≤
Qpj , Z >Q
p
k ;5)X >Q
p
i ,Y >Q
p
j , Z ≤Q
p
k ;6)X ≤Q
p
i ,Y >Q
p
j , Z >Q
p
k ;7)X >Q
p
i ,Y ≤Q
p
j , Z >Q
p
k ; and
8)X >Qpi ,Y >Q
p
j , Z >Q
p
k .
We can express the retailer’s expected profit function under PPS as the sum of the expected
profits of the demands in each case, e.g., the expected profit in Case 4) is
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpk
[
px+ py+ (1− r)pQpk +v(Q i+Q
p
j − x− y)− q(z−Q
p
k ))
]
f˜ (x, y, z)dzdydx. (5.4)
According to Eynan and Fouque (2003), and Hsieh (2011), we can express the expected profit
as the sum of independent newsvendor problems as follows:
φpps =
∫ Qpi
0
[
px+v(Qpi − x))
]
f˜ (x)dx+
∫ ∞
Qpi
[
pQpi − q(x−Q
p
i )
]
f˜ (x)dx
+
∫ Qpj
0
[
py+v(Qpj − y))
]
f˜ (y)d y+
∫ ∞
Qpj
[
pQpj − q(y−Q
p
j )
]
f˜ (y)d y
+
∫ Qpk
0
[
(1− r)pz+v(Qpk − z))
]
f˜ (z)dz+
∫ ∞
Qpk
[
(1− r)pQpk − q(z−Q
p
k )
]
f˜ (z)dz,
4The implicit assumption is that the demand switch due to the price and the product dimensiona are independent.
This is similar to and supported by the prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Zhou (2011) also pointed out
that “customers’ preference-dependent ‘loss utility’ occurs separately in the price dimension and product dimension”.
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where f˜ (x)= ∫∞y=0 ∫∞z=0 f˜ (x, y, z)dzdy, f˜ (y)= ∫∞x=0 ∫∞z=0 f˜ (x, y, z)dzdx, and f˜ (z)= ∫∞x=0 ∫∞y=0 f˜ (x, y, z)d ydx.
Therefore, the optimal inventory for the specific products i and j Qp
∗
i , Q
p∗
j and that for the PPP
Qp∗k satisfy the equations F(Q
p∗
i ) =
∫ Qp∗i−∞ f˜ (x)dx = ∫ zi−∞ fs(x)dx = p−c+qp−v+q , F(Qp∗j ) = ∫ Qp∗j−∞ f˜ (y)d y =∫ z j
−∞ fs(x)dx = p−c+qp−v+q , and F(Q
p∗
k ) =
∫ Qp∗k−∞ f˜ (z)dz = ∫ zk−∞ fs(x)dx = (1−r∗)p−c+q(1−r∗)p−v+q , respectively, where
fs(x)= 1p2pi e
−x2/2. Assuming that all the demands follow the normal distribution, we characterize
the optimal inventory decisions as follows:
Qp∗i = u˜i+ ziσ˜i,
Qp∗j = u˜ j+ z jσ˜ j,
Qp∗k = uk+ zkσk.
(5.5)
Then the expected profits of products i, j, and k can be characterized as φi = (p− c)u˜i −
[(c−v)zi+ (p−v+ q)L(zi)] σ˜i, φ j = (p− c)u˜ j −
[
(c−v)z j+ (p−v+ q)L(z j)
]
σ˜ j, and φk = ((1− r)p−
c)uk − [(c− v)zk + ((1− r)p− v+ q)L(zk)]σk, respectively, where L(z) =
∫∞
x=z(x− z) fs(x)dx (z ={
zi, z j, zk
}
) (see, e.g., Silver et al., 1998). Then the expected profit is the sum of φi, φ j, and
φk as follows:
φpps = (p− c)ui− rp(uiλ rd )− [(c−v)zi+ (p−v+ q)L(zi)] (1−λ
r
d
)σi
+ (p− c)u j− rp(u jλ rd )−
[
(c−v)z j+ (p−v+ q)L(z j)
]
(1−λ r
d
)σ j
− [(c−v)zk+ ((1− r)p−v+ q)L(zk)]λ
r
d
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j .
(5.6)
5.4 Optimal pricing and inventory allocation
In this section we derive the optimal price discount for the PPP r∗, the optimal switching rate α∗,
and the optimal inventory allocation, and then analyze the conditions under which PPS is more
profitable than TS.
Proposition 5.1. φpps is concave in r when λ rd 6 1 and decreases with r when λ
r
d > 1. φpps
is concave in α.
Proof. See the Appendix C.
This proposition implies that PPS can achieve its highest profit with a proper switch rate
induced by an optimal price discount. When λ rd > 1, all the customers switch to buying the PPP
and the model reduces to the single-product newsvendor problem, i.e. α= 1. With increasing r,
the aggregate demand uncertainty remains the same but the price of the PPP decreases. Then
the retailer cannot gain any benefit from the discount. Therefore, φpps decreases with r when
λ rd > 1 and the optimal price discount r∗ is located within the range r∗ ⊆ (0,min(d/λ,1)]. Fig.
5.2 gives an example of the profit change under PPS with respect to price discount, which also
verifies Proposition 5.1.
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Figure 5.2: Example of profit change with respect to r
(ui = u j = u= 1200,σi =σ j =σ= 500, p= 20, c= 10, q= 4,v= 6,λ= 1,d = 0.4).
Proposition 5.2. The optimal price discount r∗ is characterized by Dc = 2pr∗(uk−L(zk)σk),
where Dc = [(c−v)z+ (p−v+ q)L(z)] (ασi+ασ j)− [(c−v)zk+ (p−v+ q)L(zk)]σk, zi = z j = z, and
L(zi)= L(z j)= L(z).
Corollary 1. The condition under which PPS is more profitable than TS is that there exists a
positive r∗ for which the equation holds.
Proof. See the Appendix C.
The result is not difficult to understand. Dc means the cost saving of the switched demand
due to centralization through PPS and the right hand side of the equation is two times of the
expected revenue loss due to the price discount. Note that uk−L(zk)σk is the expected sales of the
PPP and supposed to be non-negative, the cost saving Dc should always be non-negative when
the retailer adopts PPS. This is consistent with our institution that the retailer should balance
the cost saving resulting from risk pooling and the profit loss due to the lower profit margin of
the PPP. The best optimal price discount that maximizes profit under PPS can be achieved when
the cost saving equals two times of the expected revenue loss. The corollary is intuitive with
reference to Proposition 5.2. When r∗→ 0, it is not profitable for the retailer to offer the PPP.
Proposition 5.3. The optimal switch rates and the optimal inventory decisions are char-
acterized by α∗ = λ r∗d ,Q
p∗
i = (1−α∗)ui + zi(1−α∗)σi,Q
p∗
j = (1−α∗)u j + z j(1−α∗)σ j, and Q
p∗
k =
α∗(ui+u j)+α∗zk
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j .
Proof. The proof is easy and we omit it.
Note that Qp∗k is a mix of both specific products i and j. Therefore, PPS provides allocation
flexibility, which also benefits the retailer when supply shortage occurs. We evaluate the perfor-
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mance of PPS in terms of the expected profit, inventory, and customer service level when supply
shortage occurs by numerical studies.
Proposition 5.4. φ∗pps ≥ φ∗ts, Q∗pps ≤ Q∗ts, i.e., the optimal price discount makes PPS more
profitable than TS, yielding a higher profit and lower inventory. Furthermore,
∂(Q∗pps−Q∗Ts)
∂r∗ ≤ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix C.
The proposition shows that, because φ∗ts is independent of r, φpps is concave in r when
λr/d ≤ 1. Thus, we believe that the improper pricing may make PPS worse than TS. However,
PPS can always improve profit through optimal price discount. The total inventory under PPS
always decreases with increasing optimal price discount. This is the result of the risk-pooling
effect due to demand reshape. This can be explained by Eq.(5.3) that the aggregate demand
deviation can be reduced after demand reshape, i.e., σ˜i + σ˜ j +σk ≤ σi +σ j since ρ i j ≤ 1. The
decreased demand deviation results in lower safety stock, which can decease the inventory cost.
From the perspective of practice, the excess inventory of one product can be used to meet the
demand for another product. Similar to the findings on centralized inventory (Snyder and Shen,
2011), the risk-pooling effect is significant especially when the demands for products i and j are
negatively correlated. In addition, the chance of this supply-demand match happening under
TS is very small, because the customers that intend to buy one product are usually reluctant to
accept another product without a price discount.
Proposition 5.5. The optimal profit and inventory differences have the following properties:
∂(φ∗pps−φ∗ts)
∂d < 0,
∂(φ∗pps−φ∗ts)
∂λ
> 0, ∂(Q
∗
pps−Q∗ts)
∂d > 0,and
∂(Q∗pps−Q∗ts)
∂λ
< 0, i.e., the advantage of PPS is de-
creasing in product differentiation d and increasing in customer price sensitivity (or decreasing in
customer product sensitivity).
Proof. See the Appendix C.
This proposition implies that it is more profitable to adopt PPS to sell products with smaller
product differentiation to customers with higher price sensitivity. This is easy to understand as
PPS reshapes demand through price discount. A smaller product differentiation or a higher price
sensitivity means that with a small price discount, a large proportion of the customers will switch
from buying the specific products to buying the PPP, which decreases the aggregate demand
uncertainty. So it will cost the retailer less to pool the risk, which increases the profitability of
PPS. When d is low enough or λ is large enough to make λr/d > 1 , the problem reduces to the
single-product newsvendor problem and the retailer will only offer PPP.
This can partially explain why the gashapon machines only sell PPPs, and all the Kinder
Surprise toys are packaged in opaque chocolate eggs. From the operations management perspec-
tive, when the toys are similar and customers’ price sensitivity is high, the best strategy for the
retailer is to give a very small discount to induce all the customers to buy the PPP, which can
efficiently decrease the risk of demand uncertainty. Besides, our conclusion can also partially
explain why the retailer of Kinder Joy provides two versions, i.e, the boy’s and the girl’s version,
and there are usually different gashapon machines in a store rather than one big machine.
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Because the differentiation between the Kinder Surprise toys for boys and girls are relatively
large, the retailer gives a larger price discount to induce all the customers to buy the product,
which may be worse than TS due to a loss in profit margin. On the other hand, when the price
discount is the same as before, the demand switch is very limited because a girl will not accept
the boy’s version of the toy.
The conclusion that PPS is more advantageous when customer price sensitivity is higher
may partially explain that the sealed “lucky bags” are usually offered at the end of the selling
season or during holidays in Japan. Because the customers that postpone their purchases until
the holiday time are often highly price sensitive. The retailer can give a small discount to induce
demand switch more easily. Therefore, the advantage of offering the PPP at the product release
time will not be so apparent.
5.5 Numerical studies
We examine the effects of demand uncertainty, product differentiation, and customer price
sensitivity on the performance of PPS to generate some practical insights. Then, we explore the
effect of PPS on managing supply shortage risk. For the numerical studies, we assumed that the
demands are normally distributed with ρ i j =−0.5,ui = u j = 1200,σi = [20,500],σ j = [20,500], p=
12, c= 10, q= 4,v= 6,λ= 1 and d = 0.4. So we required the maximum price discount not to exceed
1/6 to ensure that (1− r)p> c. We computed the optimal decisions using the MATLAB software.
5.5.1 Parameter analysis
In this part we explore the optimal decisions and performance of PPS under different demand
uncertainty combinations. The observations are as follows:
Observation 5.1: The optimal price discount increases with demand uncertainty.
Observation 5.2: A larger demand uncertainty increases the advantage of PPS over TS in
terms of increasing profit while decreasing inventory.
Fig. 5.3- Fig. 5.5 illustrate the relationship between demand uncertainty and the optimal
price discount, total inventory, and expected profit. With increasing demand uncertainty of one
product or both products, the retailer should give a greater price discount for the PPP to induce
more reshaped demand to pool the risk. The increasing demand uncertainty makes PPS more
advantageous than TS in terms of higher profit and lower inventory. Therefore, we can deduce
that PPS is more profitable at a higher optimal price discount. This also shows that PS can
pool the risk through demand reshape, and its effect on risk pooling will be more effective when
demand uncertainty is larger.
55
CHAPTER 5. INVENTORY-PRICING POLICY IN “PHYSICAL” PROBABILISTIC SELLING
Figure 5.3: Optimal price discount with respect
to demand uncertainty
Figure 5.4: Profit change with respect to demand
uncertainty
Figure 5.5: Inventory change with respect to de-
mand uncertainty
5.5.2 Effect of supply uncertainty
The analysis above shows the advantage of PPS in pooling the risk of demand uncertainty
through demand reshape. It is interesting to further explore the performance of PPS when supply
risk occurs. The supply risk in our study is subject to yield uncertainty which means that the
delivery quantity of the supplier is random. In reality, it may arise due to shortages of raw and
semi-finished materials, failed production schedules, quality problems, etc. We assume that the
retailer cannot predict the supply condition and does not have a second chance to order product
from other suppliers. Alternatively, the retailer adopts the default passive acceptance strategy
mentioned in Tomlin (2006) to react to supply disruption. In this section we consider the case
where the supply of one product is in shortage while the other product is unlimited to reflect
asymmetrical supply shortage, and the case where the supplies of both products are in shortage
56
5.5. NUMERICAL STUDIES
to reflect symmetrical supply shortage. We define the supply shortage rate as the percentage of
orders that are not met from supply under TS.
In addition, we define the Type-2 service level 5 as ESL=∑Nn=1 1N ESLn =∑Nn=1 1N (1−σnL(zn)),
where ESLn is the service level of product n ( Snyder and Shen, 2011). Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
show the optimal inventory, and the resulting profit and service level under both TS and PPS
when supply risk occurs. The order of the PPP Qp∗k is a mix of the specific products i and j, and
we define the proportion of product j as ϕ. Therefore, as shown in Table 5.1, the retailer will
reduce the proportion of product j allocated to the PPP (denoted by Qp∗k (ϕ)) when the supply
of product j (denoted by S j) falls short while the supply of product i is unlimited (denoted by
U). When the supplies of both products i and j fall short, we assume that the retailer would
ration the limited inventory according to the proportions of the demands for the specific and
probabilistic products. We use the same parameters of p, c, q,v,ρ i j,u,λ,d as in the above section
and σi =σ j =σ. We varied the demand standard deviation within [50,500] and took σ= 500 as
an example to present the results. φ% and ESL% denote the increases in the expected profit and
service level under PPS, respectively (compared with those under TS).
Table 5.1: The results for the case of asymmetrical supply shortage
S j Q t
∗
i Q
t∗
j Q
pps
i Q
p∗
j Q
p∗
k (ϕ) φ% ESL%
U 1326.7 1326.7 1208.05 1208.05 223.82(0.5) 9.21 2.10
1300 1326.7 1300 1208.05 1208.05 223.83(0.41) 9.53 2.28
1100 1326.7 1100 1208.05 1100 223.83(0) 32.53 4.06
900 1326.7 900 1208.05 900 223.83(0) 150.07 6.67
700 1326.7 700 1208.05 700 223.83(0) 88.36 10.34
500 1326.7 500 1208.05 500 223.83(0) 35.27 15.35
300 1326.7 300 1208.05 300 223.83(0) 21.27 22.16
100 1326.7 100 1208.05 100 223.83(0) 14.87 31.54
Table 5.2: The results for the case of symmetrical supply shortage
S j Q t
∗
i Q
t∗
j Q
pps
i Q
p∗
j Q
p∗
k (ϕ) φ% ESL%
U 1326.7 1326.7 1208.05 1208.05 223.82(0.5) 9.21 2.10
1300 1300 1300 1189.78 1189.78 220.44(0.5) 9.50 2.29
1100 1100 1100 1006.74 1006.74 186.52(0.5) 15.50 2.10
900 900 900 823.69 823.69 152.61(0.5) 17.69 1.30
700 700 700 640.65 640.65 118.7 (0.5) 0.53 0.36
500 500 500 457.61 457.61 84.78 (0.5) -0.19 -0.37
300 300 300 274.56 274.56 50.87(0.5) -0.16 -0.79
100 100 100 91.52 91.52 17(0.5) -0.03 -0.68
5The two common definitions of the service level are Type-1 service level and Type-2 service level. The Type-2
service level (also called fill rate) is defined as the percentage of demand that is met from stock. More information can
be found in Snyder and Shen (2011).
57
CHAPTER 5. INVENTORY-PRICING POLICY IN “PHYSICAL” PROBABILISTIC SELLING
Figure 5.6: Effect of asymmetrical supply short-
age
Figure 5.7: Effect of symmetrical supply shortage
Observation 5.3: PPS will be more advantageous than TS in terms of increasing profit and
service level when asymmetrical supply shortage occurs.
As shown in Fig. 5.6, with increasing supply shortage rate, profit increase will increase first
and then decrease afterwards. However, the ESL increase will always increase with the supply
shortage rate. Through demand reshape, PPS attracts customers to buy the PPP, which enables
the retailer to allocate inventory flexibly. The offer of the PPP diversifies the supply uncertainty.
The supply of the PPP comes from either of the specific products, which holds the spirit of dual
souring. Therefore, the advantage of PPS in combating supply risk is very impressive when
supply shortage is asymmetrical. However, when there is symmetrical supply shortage, the
performance of PPS is not impressive, as shown in Fig. 5.7. In fact, at a high symmetrical supply
shortage rate, the supply risk may make PPS worse than TS. This may be caused by the fact that
when both specific products are subject to shortage risk, the effect of inventory flexibility will
vanish. Furthermore, the retailer still has to allocate some inventory for the low-priced PPP even
though the demands for the regular-priced products cannot be satisfied.
5.6 Conclusions
To answer the questions of whether and how PS will benefit the retailer when the retailer offers
the PPP, we focus on studying the risk-pooling effect of PPS through demand reshape. Modelling
demand reshape under PPS, we obtain the optimal price discount for the PPP, the optimal
inventory decisions, and the resulting profit. Then we explore the effect of demand variability,
customer price (product) sensitivity, and product differentiation on the optimal outcomes. In
addition, we examine the performance of PPS in terms of profit and service levels when the
retailer faces supply shortage risk. The results show that PPS can alleviate the risks from both
the demand and supply sides simultaneously. PPS can improve profit with lower inventory at a
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proper discount, which increases with demand uncertainty. PPS is more profitable when product
differentiation is smaller and customer price (product) sensitivity is higher (lower). The numerical
results show that PPS is a viable strategy to combat asymmetrical supply shortage risk that
yields higher profits and service levels.
We prove that offering a PPP can improve the profit of the retailer, even without altering
the prices of the original products, postponing product assignment or allocating the inventory
dynamically. The implications for the studies on PS are 1) Isolating the demand switch effect
in PS, we are surprised to find that the retailer can even benefit from demand cannibalization,
i.e., the offering a lower-priced PPP may decrease the demands for the specific products. 2) We
consider a new type of PS method and explore its benefits. From a practical point of view, our
research findings may help retailers manage demand uncertainty and improve profit through
adopting PPS. Furthermore, the offer of the PPP also alleviates the retailer’s reliance on product
supply. Overall, the retailer can enjoy the benefits of demand centralization while maintaining a
decentralized product configuration by offering a low-priced PPP.
Future research may extend our work by considering the package cost under PPS, market
competition, and endogenizing the pricing of the specific products. Another direction may extend
our work by considering the procurement and production planning for PPP manufacturing when
resources are constrained. The PPP may help the manufacturer to maximize the use of the raw
materials.
59

C
H
A
P
T
E
R
6
PRICING-PRODUCT ALLOCATION POLICY IN PROBABILISTIC
SELLING WITH BARTER CHOICE
6.1 Introduction
Many sellers offer probabilistic products based on their existing products, which are called the
constituent component products, by concealing some information about the latter from customers
to increase revenues (Fay and Xie, 2008; Post, 2010; Post and Spann, 2012), improve inventory
efficiency (Fay and Xie, 2014; Zhang et al., 2016), increase market segmentation (Jiang, 2007;
Rice et al., 2014) etc. The customer who buys the probabilistic product is allocated one of the
component products by the seller and the specific information about the product is unknown
to the customer until he pays for it. For example, one can book a hotel room with no specific
address of the hotel or buy an air ticket without the airline’s name or flight time at a low price
from Hotwire.com. One can also book a trip with no specific destination at a large discount
from Germanwings.com. However, customers usually have heterogeneous preferences for the
component products and may wish to barter their allocated products for the preferred ones. If he
is lucky enough, the customer who buys the probabilistic product can increase his satisfaction if
he gets his preferred product through bartering. Just like the “Fukubukuro” (also known as the
“mystery bag” or “lucky bag”), which is a well-known Japanese New Year’s Day custom where
merchants make grab bags filled with unknown random products and sell them at substantial
discounts. If the customer is not satisfied with the probabilistic product that he is allocated, he
can exchange it for a more preferred product with other customers. One innovative e-commerce
practice called “Little Black Bag” has extended this Japanese custom from offline to online where
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customers can buy and trade fashion accessories1. The customer does not know what is exactly
in his bag until he places the order. If the customer finds that the product he likes is in another
customer’s bag, he can make an offer to trade his product with the other customer concerned.
Once the customer is happy with all the products in his bag, he can confirm the order and Little
Black Bag will ship the products to him. So, in essence, Little Black Bag is engaged in both
probabilistic selling and bartering simultaneously.
Our research is motivated by customers’ willingness to barter and the emergence of barter
platforms associated with probabilistic selling. What benefits can barter bring to the seller?
First, barter plays an advertising or marketing role. Buttyán et al. (2010) found that barter
can improve message delivery to participants and stimulate them to co-operate. Take Little
Black Bag for example, which is not a typical online shopping website, but a combination of an
online community and an online shop. Dan Murillo, CEO and co-founder of Little Black Bag,
said, “The transactions achieve 2 million per month, and the customers spend about an hour a
day using the service. It’s like going into the stock exchange” (Daniela, 2012). The information
that the customers have revealed in the barter process helps the company understand customers’
demand, and make better purchase and product assignment decisions. Besides, the customers
can share the barter information through other social networking platforms, which also helps
market their products. Therefore, increasing brands join the platform by offering lower wholesale
prices and regard it as a marketing platform to promote their products by customers themselves.
AliPay is another example that demonstrates the marketing effect of barter. AliPay sponsored the
“Collecting five blessing cards” event in 2016, which encouraged people to barter with one another
with a view to gathering the full set of cards that would entitle them to monetary rewards. The
event attracted a large number of new customers and created a huge customer relationship
network, which enabled AliPay to rank first in terms of app attention for eight consecutive days
in the 2016 spring festival in China. Second, when offered the chance to barter for the more
preferred product in the community before Little Black Bag delivers the order, the customer has
a higher valuation for the probabilistic product. This enables the company to charge a higher
price for the probabilistic product.
The innovative retailing mode that combines probabilistic selling with barter seems an
interesting and promising concept for e-commerce. However, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no research on probabilistic selling considering the barter choice. We conduct this research
to address the following questions: 1) How does barter affect the seller’s optimal decisions in
probabilistic selling? 2) Can and when does barter make probabilistic selling more advantageous
to the seller?
1Little Black Bag is a social shopping site where shoppers buy a mystery bag of fashion products for their use or
for trading with friends. The company was founded on 1 February 2012 and raised US$800 million on 16 August 2012
(source from https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/little-black-bag).
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6.2 Literature review
Our research is related to both probabilistic selling and barter. The research on probabilistic
selling is scant but growing, and all the related literature assumes that the probabilistic product
sales are non-transferable. The literature on barter focuses on exploring the economics, operations,
and marketing benefits of barter. However, there is no literature that considers the barter choice
in probabilistic selling.
6.2.1 Probabilistic selling
Existing studies on probabilistic selling assume that the probabilistic product sales are non-
refundable, non-transferable, or non-exchangeable (Fay and Xie, 2008). However, in reality, some
customers who buy the probabilistic product may wish to barter for their preferred products with
other people through various social channels. There is even a shop that offers its probabilistic
product with the barter choice. So it is interesting to explore the motivation of the firm to offer a
barter platform that facilitates customers to exchange their probabilistic products. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no research exploring the effect of barter on probabilistic selling.
6.2.2 Barter
Barter means that businesses or individuals can trade their undesired goods for the goods they
need directly without the use of money. With the development of Internet-based technology and
rapid globalization, barter services have staged a comeback to become a global form of trade, not
only at the individual level but also at the firm level.
Some literature studies the advantages of barter from the economic and operational perspec-
tives. Williams (1996) observed that the barter system provides economic value to its members.
Lobo and de Sousa (2014) found that barter can increase value by reducing the depreciation rate.
Prendergast and Stole (2001) showed that barter can create liquidity for cash-constrained firms.
Chen and Kao (2010) observed that barter is more popular during periods of hyper-inflation. Özer
and Özturan (2011) proved that barter can increase the efficiency of allocation and satisfaction of
participants in auctions. Plank et al. (1994) studied barter as a tool of moving excess inventory.
Another huge benefit of barter is helping an enterprise to create partnerships and networks
with other businesses, which can help refer, promote, and market the former’s business. So a
few studies consider the marketing benefit of bartering. For example, Ference (2009) observed
that barter can help businesses build long-term mutual trust relationships. Guriev and Kvassov
(2004) regarded barter as a tool to price-discriminate between customers who pay in cash and
those who pay in kind. Oliver and Mpinganjira (2011) observed that barter can increase trade
sales volume and facilitate entry into new markets.
No literature has considered barter in probabilistic selling. A barter platform gives customers
a chance to improve their satisfaction by bartering their products for preferred ones. Also, when
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customers barter with one another on the platform or share their products through other channels
by inviting other people to join the platform, the transaction information delivered by customers
can not only help businesses understand customers’ preferences, but also act as a marketing tool
to expand the market.
6.3 The Model
6.3.1 Assumptions and definitions
We assume that a seller sells online two functionally similar component products j = 1,2 of
equal costs: c1 = c2 = c ⊆ [0,1]. It also offers a probabilistic product that can be one of the two
component products with given probabilities. Besides, the seller offers the customers who buy
the probabilistic product a choice to exchange their products in the seller’s barter community.
Specifically, as shown in Fig. 6.1, the product information is revealed to the customer when he
places the order. If the customer gets the product he prefers, he will confirm the order; otherwise,
he chooses to barter his product for another one in the barter community. We assume that the
marketing role of barter is proportional to the quantity of successful barter products. In addition,
we assume that the successful barter probability is α⊆ (0,1) in practice. Finally, the customer
will confirm the order no matter whether he gets his preferred product after bartering.
Figure 6.1: Event sequence of probabilistic selling with barter.
Following Fay and Xie (2008), we assume that the customer’s valuations for the two component
products follow the Hotelling model. We define vi j as the valuation for product j of customer i,
whose location on the Hotelling line is xi with a fit-cost-loss coefficient t. So customers’ valuations
for the two component products without barter are given in Eq. (6.1) as follows:{
v1i = 1− txi,
v2i = 1− t(1− xi).
(6.1)
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On the other hand, customers’ valuations for the two component products with the barter choice
are given in Eq. (6.2) as follows:{
v∗1i = v1i+α(v2i−v1i)+,
v∗2i = v2i+α(v1i−v2i)+.
(6.2)
As shown in Eq. (6.2), if a customer who buys the probabilistic product values product 1 over
product 2 (i.e., v1i> v2i) while being allocated product 2, he will choose to barter and his valuation
for product 2 becomes v2i+α(v1i−v2i). If a customer has the same valuations for product 1 and
product 2, then he has no motivation to choose barter and his valuations for the products will
not change when offered the barter choice. Besides, we assume that product 1 is allocated as the
probabilistic product with probability ϕ⊆ [0,1]. Then, customers’ valuation for the probabilistic
product without the barter choice is v0i = ϕv1i + (1−ϕ)v2i, while with the barter choice, the
valuation becomes v∗0i =ϕv∗1i+ (1−ϕ)v∗2i. We use the following definitions throughout this chapter.
6.3.2 Probabilistic selling with barter
Without loss of generality, we confine our analysis to the case where ϕ≥ 1/2 because we assume
that the demand is symmetric, i.e., the results when ϕ6 1/2 (i.e., product 2 is allocated as the
probabilistic product with ϕ ≥ 1/2) is the same. Then according to Eq. (6.2), the valuation for
the probabilistic product v∗0i of the customer who prefers product 1 to product 2 (i.e., xi < 1/2)
decreases with xi. The valuation for the probabilistic product v∗0i of the customer who prefers
product 2 to product 1 (i.e., xi > 1/2) increases with xi when 12 ≤ ϕ < ϕ¯ and decreases with xi
when ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1. Therefore, there are two possible outcomes of the Hotelling line of probabilistic
selling with barter as shown in Fig. 6.2. It is noted that ϕ¯= 12(1−α) is the allocation probability
that makes customers who prefer product 2(1) to product 1(2) have the same valuation with the
customer who is indifferent product 1 and product 2 (i.e., v∗0i=1-t/2). Furthermore, the larger the
allocation probability is, the larger the successful barter probability it will need to make the
customers have the same valuation. In the first case where 12 ≤ϕ< ϕ¯, the Hotelling line is divided
into three segments: customers with xi ≤ xˆ1 purchase product 1, customers with xi ≥ xˆ2 purchase
product 2, and customers with xˆ1 < xi < xˆ3 and xˆ4 < xi < xˆ2 purchase the probabilistic product.
In the second case where ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1, the Hotelling line is divided into three segments: customers
with xi ≤ xˆ1 purchase product 1, customers with xi ≥ xˆ2 purchase product 2, and customers with
xˆ1 < xi < xˆ3 purchase the probabilistic product.
The seller that uses probabilistic selling with barter will choose either full coverage or partial
coverage of the market, depending on which yields a higher profit. Therefore, in this section
we first derive the seller’s optimal pricing and optimal allocation probability, and the resulting
profits of probabilistic selling with barter in a fully covered market (i.e., xˆ3=xˆ4=1/2 in Fig. 6.2(a)
and xˆ3=xˆ2 in Fig. 6.2(b)) and a partially covered market (i.e., xˆ3<1/2/xˆ4>1/2 in Fig. 6.2(a) and
xˆ3<xˆ2 in Fig. 6.2(b)). We then compare the optimal profits between the two markets to derive the
seller’s optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter.
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Variable Definition
c The costs of the products c⊆ [0,1]
ϕ Product 1 is allocated as the probabilistic product with probability ϕ⊆ [0,1]
q The marketing benefit brought by per unit of the barter product q≥ 0
α⊆ (0,1) The probability that the customer who buys the probabilistic product can
get his preferred one through bartering
xˆ1 The maximum value of xi for which a customer will purchase product 1
xˆ2 The minimum value of xi for which a customer will purchase product 2
ϕ¯( ¯¯ϕ)
The allocation probability that makes customers who prefer product 2(1) to product 1(2)
have the same valuation with the customer who is indifferent product 1 and product 2
ppsj , p
ps
0
The price of the component product j and the probabilistic product in probabilistic selling
without barter
ppbj , p
pb
0
The price of the component product j and the probabilistic product in probabilistic selling
with barter
Dpbj , D
pb
0
The sales of the component product j and the probabilistic product in probabilistic selling
with barter
GTs The profit of traditional selling in which the seller does not offer the probabilistic product
Gb The marketing benefit for the seller from offering the barter choice
Gbp, Gps The profits of probabilistic selling with and without barter, respectively
GCa, G Ia
The profits of probabilistic selling with barter in a fully and partially covered market,
respectively, when the seller makes positive sales of the component products
G∗Ca, G
∗
Ia
The profits of probabilistic selling with barter in a fully and partially covered market,
respectively, when the seller only sells the probabilistic product
6.3.2.1 Optimal strategy with barter in a fully covered market
As shown in Fig. 6.2(a), the optimal price of the probabilistic product ppb0 should be 1− t/2 to
make sure that the market is fully covered. Otherwise, as shown in Fig. 6.2(b), the optimal
price ppb0 should be the valuation for the probabilistic product v
∗
0i at location xˆ2 (i.e., p
pb
0 =
ϕ (1− tx2+αt(2x2−1))+(1−ϕ)(1−t(1−x2))). So we compare the optimal profit GACa when 12 ≤ϕ< ϕ¯
and optimal profit GBCa when ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1 to derive the optimal strategy. The profit function is
GCa =
2∑
j=1
(
ppdj − c
)
D j+
(
ppd0 − c
)
D0+Gb. (6.3)
With xi < 1/2, customer i prefers product 1 to product 2. When the customer buys the
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(a) 12 ≤ϕ< ϕ¯
(b) ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1
Figure 6.2: Customer valuations
probabilistic product, it turns out to be product 1 with probability ϕ and product 2 with probability
1−ϕ. When the customer gets his preferred product, he confirms the order. Otherwise, he chooses
to barter, while offering the barter choice will bring more benefit to the firm. For example in Fig.
6.2(b), when the customer prefers product 1, i.e., xi < 1/2, the benefit (e.g., a lower wholesale price
because of the marketing role of bartering, more accurate decisions because of big data about
the market etc) brought by barter is expressed as (1/2− xˆ1)qα(1−ϕ). When the consumer prefers
product 2, i.e., xi > 1/2, the marketing benefit brought by barter in the market where xi > 1/2 is
expressed as (xˆ3−1/2)qαϕ. Therefore, Gb = (1/2− xˆ1)qα(1−ϕ)+ (xˆ3−1/2)qαϕ for the case of Fig.
6.2(b).
From Fay and Xie (2008), the optimal profit of traditional selling is
GTs =
1− t/2− c if c≤ 1− t,(1−c)2
2t if c> 1− t.
(6.4)
Taking into account that the seller may not offer the probabilistic product, we compare GCa
with GTs to derive the seller’s optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter in a fully
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covered market as follows2:
With 0<α≤ α˜,
GCa =
−
q2α2−2t(−1+α)(4+qa)+t2(−3+2α+α2)
8t(−1+α) − c if c≤ ¯¯c, ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
(1−c)2
2t if c> ¯¯c,
(6.5)
and with α˜<α< 1,
G∗Ca =
1− c−
t
2 + qα2 if c≤~c, ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
(1−c)2
2t ifc>~c,
(6.6)
where ¯¯c= 1− t+ t/2
√
(t(1−α)+qα)2
t2(1−α) ,~c= 1− t+
p
qtα , ϕ¯= 12(1−α) , ¯¯ϕ= 1−2α2(1−α) , and α˜= tq+t .
Our analysis proves that the optimal profit when 12 ≤ϕ< ϕ¯ outperforms that when ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1,
i.e., GACa ≥GBCa. Thus, the optimal price is p
pb∗
0 = 1− 12 t. Furthermore, due to symmetry of the
model, ¯¯ϕ ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ 12 is the optimal allocation probability when ϕ∗ ≤ 12 . Therefore, the optimal
allocation probability in a fully covered market is ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯. We give the optimal pricing for the
component products in the Appendix.
Note that a˜ is the dividing point where there are positive demands for the component products.
When 0≤α< α˜, the seller will offer both the probabilistic product and component products in
probabilistic selling with barter. Otherwise, when the successful barter probability is high enough,
i.e., α> α˜, the seller will only offer the probabilistic product. Eq. (6.5) and Eq. (6.6) indicate that
when the product price is relatively low, i.e., c≤ ¯¯c when α≤ α˜ and c≤~c when α˜<α< 1, the seller
can improve its profit through probabilistic selling with barter. When the product price is high,
i.e., c > ¯¯c when α ≤ α˜ and c >~c when α˜ < α < 1, traditional selling is optimal. This finding is
consistent with that in Fay and Xie (2008).
6.3.2.2 Optimal strategy with barter in a partially covered market
Similarly, we derive the seller’s optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter in a partially
covered market as follows:
With 0<α≤ α˜,
G Ia =

1− t2 − c if 0< c≤ 1− t,
(1−c)2
2t if 1− t< c≤ c˜,
− (4+4c2+4qα)(1−α)+t2(−1+a)2+q2α2+(−1+α)(4t+2αt(−2+q)+8c+4ct(−1+α)+4cqα)8t(−1+α)α if c˜< c< ˜˜c,
(1−c)2
2t if c≥ ˜˜c,
(6.7)
and with α˜<α< 1,
G∗Ia =
1−
t
2 − c if 0< c≤ 1− t,
(1−c)2
2t ifc> 1− t,
(6.8)
2All the proofs in this chapter are given in the Appendix D.
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where c˜ = 1− 12 t+ qα−αt2 and ˜˜c = 1− 12 t+ qα2(1−α) . G∗Ia is the seller’s optimal profit when it only
offers the probabilistic product. Eq. (6.7) shows that when 0<α≤ α˜ and c˜< c< ˜˜c, the seller can
benefit from probabilistic selling and the optimal allocation probability is ϕ∗ = 12 . Otherwise,
offering no probabilistic product, i.e., traditional selling, is optimal. As shown in Eq. (6.8), when
α˜<α< 1, offering merely the probabilistic product will decrease the seller’s profit, while offering
no probabilistic products is optimal. Therefore, there is no optimal price for the probabilistic
product or the optimal allocation probability when α˜<α< 1. We provide the optimal pricing and
allocation decisions in a partially covered market in the Appendix.
6.3.2.3 Optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter
We compare the profits and the corresponding conditions analyzed above to derive the seller’s
optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1: Given the successful barter probability threshold α˜, the seller’s optimal
strategy for probabilistic selling with barter is as follows:
With 0<α≤ α˜,
Gbp =Max [GCa,G Ia,GTs]=

GACa if c≤ c˜, ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
GAIa if c˜< c< ˜˜c, ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GTs if c≥ ˜˜c,
(6.9)
and with α˜<α< 1,
G∗bp =Max
[
G∗Ca,G
∗
Ia,GTs
]=
G
∗
Ca if c≤~c , ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
GTs if~c< c≤ 1.
(6.10)
From the above results, when 0 < α < α˜, we see that when the product cost c is small,
i.e., c ≤ c˜, it is optimal for the seller to offer the probabilistic product and the market is fully
covered. When the cost c is relatively high, i.e., c˜< c< ˜˜c, it is optimal for the seller to offer the
probabilistic product at a higher price and choose to partially cover the market (refer to Table
6.1). When α˜ < α < 1, there are no demands for the component products. When c ≤~c, offering
merely the probabilistic product with barter and fully covering the market is the optimal strategy
for the seller. When the product cost is sufficiently high, i.e., c >~c when 0 < α < α˜ and c > ˜˜c
when α˜<α< 1, the seller should not offer the probabilistic product. We summarize the optimal
decisions on price and allocation probability, and the resulting sales in Table 6.1.
Proposition 6.2: Increasing successful barter probability α and the marketing benefit brought
by per barter unit q gradually cannibalize the sales of the component products. The selling decision
on offering the component products or not in probabilistic selling depends on the successful barter
probability α, marketing benefit per barter unit q, and product differentiation t. In addition,
∂α˜
∂q < 0 and ∂α˜∂t > 0.
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Table 6.1: Optimal decisions of probabilistic selling with barter
α≤ α˜ α> α˜
D j

−t+qα+tα
4t(−1+α) if c≤ c˜
−t+qα+tα
4t(−1+α) if c˜< c< ˜˜c
1−c
2t if c≥ ˜˜c
{
0 if c≤~c
1−c
2t if c>~c
D0

tα−qα−t
2t(−1+α) if c≤ c˜
2−2c−t−2α+2cα+qα+tα
2tα−2tα2 if c˜< c< ˜˜c
0 if c≥ ˜˜c
{
1 if c≤~c
0 if c>~c
ppb0

1− 12 t if c≤ c˜
1
4 (2+2c+ t(−1+α)− qα) if c˜< c< ˜˜c
N/A if c≥ ˜˜c
{
1− 12 t if c≤~c
N/A if c>~c
ppb1

1
2 (2+α(q− t)(1−ϕ)− tϕ) if c≤ c˜
1− 12 t if c˜< c< ˜˜c
1+c
2 if c≥ ˜˜c
{
N/A if c≤~c
1+c
2 if c>~c
ppb2

1
2 (2+α(q− t)ϕ− t(1−ϕ)) if c≤ c˜
1− 12 t if c˜< c< ˜˜c
1+c
2 if c≥ ˜˜c
{
N/A if c≤~c
1+c
2 if c>~c
ϕ∗

[
¯¯ϕ, ϕ¯
]
if c≤ c˜
1/2 if c˜< c< ˜˜c
N/A if c≥ ˜˜c
{[
¯¯ϕ, ϕ¯
]
if c≤~c
N/A if c>~c
Increasing successful barter probability will increase the valuation for the probabilistic
product, which makes the probabilistic product more attractive to customers. Note that a˜ is the
threshold that makes all the customers switch to buying the probabilistic product. Therefore,
when α≤ α˜, the seller will offer both the probabilistic product and component products, while
it only offers the probabilistic product when α> α˜. Furthermore, as the marketing benefit per
barter unit increases, the threshold decreases, i.e., the seller is more likely to merely offer the
probabilistic product. t can be interpreted as the degree of horizontal product differentiation. As
product differentiation increases, the threshold increases, i.e., the seller is likely to offer both
the component products and the probabilistic product. This means increasing marketing benefit
per barter unit encourages the seller to merely offer the probabilistic product, while increasing
product differentiation plays the opposite role.
This proposition provides important guidance to the seller as to whether or not to offer
the component products in probabilistic selling with barter: If product differentiation is high
while customers’ successful barter probability is low, the seller may consider offering both the
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component and probabilistic products. Offering merely the probabilistic product is advantageous
only when customers’ successful barter probability is high enough.
6.4 Comparison with probabilistic selling without barter
choice
From Fay and Xie (2008), the seller’s optimal profit of probabilistic selling without the barter
choice is as follows:
Gps =
1− c−
3
8 t if c≤ cˆ,
(1−c)2
2t if c> cˆ,
(6.11)
where cˆ= 1− t/2.
We compare Gbp with the profit without barter Gps and define ∆bp−ps = Gbp −Gps (the
detailed comparison results are given in the Appendix). Fig. 6.3 summarizes the comparison
results between probabilistic selling without barter (PS) and probabilistic selling with barter
(PB) when (a) 0< q< t4 , (b)14 t≤ q≤ 13 t, (c) 13 t≤ q< 12 t, and (d) 12 t≤ q< t. In Fig. 6.3, PB denotes
the strategy that the seller offers both the component and probabilistic products with barter
when α≤ α˜. PB∗ denotes the strategy when there are no demands for the component products
and the seller only offers the probabilistic product with barter when α> α˜. PS denotes that the
seller offers both the component and probabilistic products without the barter choice. TS denotes
that there is no demand for the probabilistic product and the seller only offers the component
products, i.e., traditional selling without the probabilistic product.
Proposition 6.3: Barter broadens the application range of probabilistic selling, which in-
creases with the successful barter probability when it is below or above the threshold α˜.
As shown in Fig. 6.3, the seller cannot benefit from probabilistic selling when the product
cost is high enough. This result is consistent with that in Fay and Xie (2008), who proved that
probabilistic selling cannot benefit the seller when c> 1− t/2. However, offering the barter choice
renders probabilistic selling more profitable than traditional selling when 1− t/2< c < ˜˜c if the
successful barter probability is below a threshold, i.e., α≤ α˜, and when 1− t/2< c<~c if successful
barter probability is above a threshold, i.e., α> α˜. It is easy to prove that both ˜˜c and~c are greater
than 1− t/2. Thus, we can deduce that when the product cost is high, i.e., 1− t/2 < c < ˜˜c when
α ≤ α˜ and 1− t/2 < c <~c when α > α˜, the offer of the barter choice makes probabilistic selling
beneficial to the seller. In other words, barter broadens the application range of probabilistic
selling. However, offering the probabilistic product can never be the strategy to increase profit
when the product’s value is much more higher, i.e., c≥ ˜˜c and c≥~c.
The proposition has significant implications for practice. For the seller, when the product cost
is relatively high, it may consider offering the barter choice in probabilistic selling to increase
its profit (refer to Proposition 6.4). When the successful barter probability is below or above the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.3: Optimal strategies under different conditions.
threshold α˜, the higher the product cost is, the higher the successful barter probability it needs
to make probabilistic selling advantageous over traditional selling.
Proposition 6.4: The decision as to whether or not to offer the barter choice depends on the
product cost c, successful barter probability α, and marketing benefit per barter unit q. Specifically,
1) When the successful barter probability is below a threshold, i.e., α≤ α˜, the seller considers
the three strategies of PS, PB, and TS. If the marketing benefit is small, i.e., 0 < q ≤ t3 , PS is
optimal when the cost is low, i.e., c≤ c¯, and PB is optimal when the cost is medium, i.e., c¯< c< ˜˜c.
2)When the successful barter probability is above a threshold, i.e., α> α˜, the seller considers
the three strategies of PS, PB∗, and TS. If q is sufficiently low, i.e., q< 1/4t, the offer of the barter
choice will decrease the profit of probabilistic selling. If the marketing benefit is sufficiently high,
i.e., q≥ 1/3t, then barter can increase the profit of probabilistic selling.
3)When the cost is high enough, i.e., c≥~c when α> α˜ and c≥ ˜˜c when α≤ α˜, it is optimal not to
offer the probabilistic product.
4)When the marketing benefit is sufficiently large, i.e., q≥ 12 , barter increases the profit of PS.
When the marketing benefit is q= 0, barter decreases the profit of PS when 0<α< 1.
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The implications of the above findings for practice are that the successful barter probability
is not necessarily the higher the better for probabilistic selling with barter. The performance also
depends on the marketing benefit brought by bartering. Increasing successful barter probability
α increases the valuation for the probabilistic product, which can cannibalize the sales of the
high-priced component products. Therefore, barter will weaken the price-discrimination effect of
probabilistic selling and make the probabilistic product more attractive. From this perspective,
barter will undermine the value of probabilistic selling. However, from another point of view, the
more people that buy the probabilistic product, the more marketing benefit the seller can gain
from bartering. Thus, when the marketing benefit brought by per unit of the barter product is low
while the successful barter probability is high, the profit increase through bartering cannot offset
the profit decrease. Just as shown in Fig. 6.3(a), offering the barter choice cannot benefit the seller
when the successful barter probability is above a threshold, i.e., α> α˜ while q is sufficiently low,
i.e., 0< q< 1/4t. In the extreme case where the marketing benefit is q= 0, barter will decrease
the profit of PS when 0<α< 1.
Proposition 6.5: The cost ranges that make probabilistic selling with barter more profitable
than probabilistic selling without barter, i.e.,
(
c¯, ˜˜c
)
and (0,~c) increase with the successful barter
probability.
The implications of the above finding for practice are that when offering probabilistic selling
with the barter choice, the seller can choose its products depending on the estimated successful
barter probability. Provided that the successful barter probability is above or below a threshold,
the higher the successful barter probability is, the wider are the ranges of products that the seller
can sell through probabilistic selling with barter.
6.5 Extension
We assume in the above study that successful barter probability α is exogenous and independent
with the allocation probability ϕ. In reality, successful barter probability α highly depends on
allocation probability: even allocation leads to the highest successful barter probability, and the
successful barter probability will be very low when the allocation probability is seriously uneven.
Therefore, we consider successful barter probability α depends on allocation probability in
the extension part. The successful barter probability achieves its highest when ϕ = 1/2 while
becomes zero when ϕ= 0 or ϕ= 1. This is consistent with the reality that no barter happens when
all the customers get the same product. Even when ϕ= 1/2, we cannot guarantee the successful
barter probability be 1 for reasons like customer patience, customer arrival sequence, and other
operational issues. Therefore, we use k⊆ [0,1] to capture the effect of operations on the successful
barter probability α and define it as barter probability. Making α⊆ [0,1] , we define the successful
barter probability α= 4kϕ(1−ϕ).
Keeping other assumptions and definitions the same, we first derive the seller’s optimal
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Table 6.2: Optimal allocation strategies of probabilistic selling with barter
q k ϕ∗
q≤ t/2 k≤ k1 ∂G
A
Ca
∂ϕ
> 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯ ∂G
B
Ca
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯
k1 < k≤ k˜ ∂G
A
Ca
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = 12
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯
k> k˜ ∂G
A
Ca
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = 12
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯
q> t/2 k≤ k˜ ∂G
A
Ca
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = 12
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯
k> k˜ ∂G
A
Ca
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = 12
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
< 0,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯
Note: ϕ¯ is the solution of the equation 8kϕ2(1−ϕ)= 2ϕ−1, k1 = −2q+t4(q−t)(−ϕ+ϕ2) , and k˜=
t
q+t .
allocation strategies of probabilistic selling with barter in Table 6.2. We find that even allocation
is optimal except for the case when both the barter probability and the marketing benefit are
relatively low, i.e., k ≤ k1 and q ≤ q ≤ t/2. In that case, the profit increases with allocation
probability (e.g., the optimal profit decreases with the successful barter probability α). That
means when the barter probability is very low, the overall marketing benefit cannot offset the
loss due to the cannibalized sales of high-priced component products. And then the lower the
successful barter probability, the higher the profit. Similarly, comparing the resulting profit
results and corresponding conditions analyzed, we then derive the seller’s optimal strategy for
probabilistic selling with barter in Proposition 6.6.
Proposition 6.6: Given the barter probability k, the seller’s optimal strategy for probabilistic
selling with barter is as follows:
With k≤ k1 and q/2,
Gbp =Max [GCa,G Ia]=

GACa if c≤ c˜,ϕ∗ = ϕ¯,
GAIa if c˜< c< ˜˜c, ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GTs if c≥ ˜˜c,
(6.12)
and with k1 < k≤ k˜,
Gbp =Max [GCa,G Ia]=

GACa if c≤ c˜,ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GAIa if c˜< c< ˜˜c,ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GTs if c≥ ˜˜c,
(6.13)
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and with k˜< k≤ 1,
G∗bp =Max
[
G∗Ca,G
∗
Ia
]=
G
∗
Ca if c≤~c ,ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GTs if~c< c≤ 1,
(6.14)
where c˜ = 1− 12 t+ qα−αt2 , ˜˜c = 1− 12 t+ qα2(1−α) , ~c = 1− t+
p
qtα , α˜= tq+t ,k1 = −2q+t4(q−t)(−ϕ+ϕ2) ,α= k, α˜=
k˜= tq+t .
We get the same result that the optimal profit when 12 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕ¯ outperforms that when
ϕ¯≤ϕ≤ 1. And proposition 6.2 still holds. Besides, we also prove that GACa is worse off than GPs
and G Ia when k ≤ k1 and q ≤ 12 . Then the comparison results of PS, PB, and TS considering
different conditions of product cost c, barter probability k, successful barter probability α, and
the marketing benefit q is the same with Fig. 6.3 except for that the successful barter probability
α= k and α∗ = k∗ = tq+t . Therefore, the propositions 6.3-6.5 still hold. Besides, if the seller chooses
PB strategy, even allocation can help to achieve the maximum profit.
6.6 Conclusions
Motivated by existing online shopping platforms that support customers who buy probabilistic
products to barter their allocated products for their preferred products, we study the seller’s opti-
mal pricing and allocation strategies for probabilistic selling with the barter choice. Considering
the effects of product cost, barter probability, and marketing benefit brought by bartering, we
explore when barter benefits probabilistic selling and makes it more profitable to the seller. We
find a barter probability threshold for offering the component products in probabilistic selling
with barter. Above the threshold, the probabilistic product will cannibalize all the component
product sales, and then the seller prefers to fully cover the market and offer merely the proba-
bilistic product. When the barter probability is below the threshold, barter can increase the profit
of probabilistic selling when the product cost is medium and the cost ranges increase with the
barter probability. Besides, barter can broaden the application range of probabilistic selling and
the range will increase with the barter probability.
This is the first study on probabilistic selling with the barter choice. Our findings shed light
on the practice of probabilistic selling with the barter choice. First, our findings help the seller
in making decisions on pricing, allocation probability, and product line design, i.e., the seller
merely offers the component products, merely the probabilistic product, or both. Second, our
analysis helps the seller understand when and how to offer the barter choice in probabilistic
selling to achieve the maximum profit with consideration of product cost, successful barter
probability, marketing benefit brought by per barter unit. Specifically, Fay and Xie (2008) proved
that probabilistic selling can improve the seller’s profit only when the product cost is low, i.e.,
c≤ 1/2. Our research indicates that when the product cost is high, i.e., c> 1/2, the seller can offer
the barter choice in probabilistic selling to increase its profit under some conditions. When the
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barter probability is below or above a threshold, the higher the product cost is, the higher the
barter probability is needed to make probabilistic selling advantageous over traditional selling.
However, the barter probability is not necessarily the higher the better. When the marketing
benefit brought by bartering is sufficiently low and the barter probability is high, the seller will
not benefit from offering the barter choice.
In this study we assume that the demand is deterministic and symmetrical. Future studies
can extend our model to consider demand uncertainty and asymmetrical demand. In addition,
the barter probability is independent of the demand distribution in our model. However, when
the demand is asymmetrical, the probability of bartering products A for B and that of bartering
products B for A may be different. While we focus on the profit of the seller in our study, future
research may consider the effect of barter on consumer welfare in probabilistic selling.
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Considering different characteristics of the probabilistic product, the buyer, and the seller involved
in probabilistic selling, i.e., the probabilistic product form, the buyers’ behaviours of demand
switch and barter exchange, and the seller’s behaviours of product allocation, we establish model
and solve the decision problems of pricing, inventory, joint decision of pricing-inventory, and
product allocation, etc. Comparing probabilistic selling with traditional selling, probabilistic
selling with barter choice with probabilistic selling without barter choice, and probabilistic selling
with inventory substitution, we have derived some conditions to optimize probabilistic selling.
Based on the analysis of optimal decision and strategy comparison results, we shed some lights
on the profitability and the effectiveness of probabilistic selling on managing uncertainty.
The main results show that probabilistic selling can benefit the seller with higher expected
profit by reducing demand/supply uncertainty and improving inventory efficiency. The per-
formance of probabilistic selling is closely dependent on customers’ price sensitivity, product
similarity, and uncertainty level, etc.
The thesis has important implications for the practice. First, the thesis helps the sellers
understand the mechanism of probabilistic selling on managing demand uncertainty and supply
uncertainty. Second, the thesis helps sellers take full advantage of probabilistic selling by opti-
mizing their inventory, pricing and related implementation issues in more realistic circumstances.
Third, the thesis provides some references for the sellers to coordinate marketing and operational
decisions in practice to improve their profit.
The thesis has important implications for the existing theory. First, the thesis riches related
Operational Management research on inventory management in probabilistic selling. Second,
we focus on exploring the mechanism of this innovative marketing strategy as an inventory
management tool to combat uncertainty. Then the work also riches the literature on inventory
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management. Third, the models and analysis methods in the thesis may also apply to the study
of other similar Operations-Marketing interface problems.
The implementation forms of probabilistic selling is diverse and flexible, with many in-
teresting decision-making issues that need to be resolved. The future research directions as
follows:
(1) Probability selling strategy considering consumer behavior
Due to the incomplete information of the probabilistic product, customers may behave overcon-
fident, limited rational, optimistic/pessimistic, and brand loyalty, etc. in the purchasing process.
These customer behaviours will influence seller’s operational decisions in probabilistic selling.
(2) Cooperation mechanism design in probabilistic selling
Sellers using probabilistic selling must determine the product mix, the proposition of one
component product in the mix, and if the offer of the probabilistic product is limited, etc. Further-
more, creating probabilistic products may require the cooperation of multiple competing suppliers
similar with the opaque intermediary. Therefore, probabilistic selling will lead to selling coopera-
tion and game among channel participants, and furthermore affects other related operations, e.g,
advertising cooperation, production cooperation, supply management, etc.
(3)Production operations management in probabilistic selling
Since there is no need to develop additional physical product when the seller extends the
product line by creating the probabilistic product. Then expect this selling strategy can reduce
manufacturer’s cost on product design, procurement, and production.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The expected profit function is
E(Q i p,Q j p)=∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
0
[pDpi + pD
p
j + p0D
p
0 + s(Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j −D
p
0 )] f
∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
[pDpi + pD
p
j + p0(Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )] f
∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ Qpi −Dpi
0
[pDpi + pQ
p
j + p0D0+ s(Q
p
i −D
p
i −D0)] f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
Qpi −Dpi
[pDpi + pQ
p
j + p0(Q
p
i −D
p
i )] f
∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpj −Dpj
0
[pQpi + pD
p
j + p0D0+ s(Q
p
j −D
p
j −D0)] f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpj −Dpj
[pQpi + pD
p
j + p0(Q
p
j −D
p
j )] f
∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
0
[pQpi + pQ
p
j ] f
∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
− c(Qpi +Q
p
j ).
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So
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
∂Qpi
=
s
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p0
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ s
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ Qpi −Dpi
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p0
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
Qpi −Dpi
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpj −Dpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpj −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxidx jdxk
− c,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
∂Qpj
=
s
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p0
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpi +Qpj −Dpi −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ Qpi −Dpi
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
Qpi −Dpi
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ s
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpj −Dpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p0
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
∫ ∞
Qpj −Dpj
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxk
+ p
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
0
f ∗(xi, x j, xk)dxidx jdxidx jdxk
− c,
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∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpi
=
(s− p0)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j,Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )dxidx jdxk
+ (s− p)
∫ Qpj
0
∫ Qpj −Dpj
0
f ∗(Qpi , x j, xk)dx jdxk
+ (s− p0)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpj
f ∗(xi, x j,Q
p
i −D
p
i )dxidx j
+ (p0− p)
∫ ∞
Qpj
∫ ∞
0
f ∗(Qpi , x j, xk)dx jdxk
+ (p0− p)
∫ Q2
0
∫ ∞
Q2−D2
f ∗(Qpi −D
p
i , x j, xk)dx jdxk ≤ 0,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpj
=
(s− p0)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j,Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )dxidx jdxk
+ (s− p)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpi −Dpi
0
f ∗(xi,Q
p
j , xk)dxidxk
+ (s− p0)
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ Qpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j,Q
p
j −D
p
j )dxidx j
+ (p0− p)
∫ ∞
Qpi
∫ ∞
0
f ∗(xi,Q
p
j , xk)dxidxk
+ (p0− p)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ ∞
Qpi −Dpi
f ∗(xi,Q
p
j , xk)dxidxk ≤ 0.
In addition,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
=
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
=
(s− p0)
∫ Qpi
0
∫ Qpj
0
f ∗(xi, x j,Q
p
i +Q
p
j −D
p
i −D
p
j )dxidx jdxk
Therefore, the Hessian Matrix ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpi
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0.
We have the result.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The optimal order quantities must satisfy the following equations
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
∂Qpi
= p− (p− s)F(Qpi ∗)+ (p0− s)G(Q
p
i
∗,Qpj
∗)− c= 0,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
∂Qpj
= p− (p− s)F(Qpj ∗)+ (p0− s)N(Q
p
i
∗,Qpj
∗)− c= 0.
Differentiating the above results with respect to p0 yields a∗
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
+b∗ ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
= −G(Qpi ∗,Q
p
j
∗),
c∗ ∂E(Q
p
i
∗)
∂p0
+d∗ ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
= −N(Qpi ∗,Q
p
j
∗).
where a∗, b∗, c∗, and d∗ denote the values of
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpi
,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
,
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
, and
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpj
at
(Qpi
∗,Qpj
∗), respectively.
Then we get 
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
= b
∗N(Qpi
∗,Qpj
∗)−d∗G(Qpi ∗,Qpj ∗)
a∗d∗−b∗c∗ ,
∂E(Qpj
∗)
∂p0
= c
∗G(Qpi
∗,Qpj
∗)−a∗N(Qpi ∗,Qpj ∗)
a∗d∗−b∗c∗ .
There are four cases to consider as follows:
Case 1 If {c∗G>a∗N & b∗N<d∗G}, then {G < a∗c∗ N & G < b
∗
d∗ N &
a∗
c∗ > 1 & b
∗
d∗ < 1}. Therefore,
we can deduce that
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
< 0 and ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
> 0 with G < b∗d∗ N.
Case 2 If {c∗G<a∗N & b∗N>d∗G}, then {G > a∗c∗ N & G > b
∗
d∗ N &
a∗
c∗ > 1 & b
∗
d∗ < 1}. Therefore,
we can deduce that
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
> 0 and ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
< 0 with G > a∗c∗ N.
Case 3 If {c∗G>a∗N & b∗N>d∗G}, then {G < a∗c∗ N & G > b
∗
d∗ N &
a∗
c∗ > 1 & b
∗
d∗ < 1}. Therefore,
we can deduce that
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
> 0 and ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
> 0 with b∗d∗ N <G < a
∗
c∗ N.
Case 4 If {c∗G<a∗N & b∗N<d∗G}, then {G > a∗c∗ N & G < b
∗
d∗ N &
a∗
c∗ > 1 & b
∗
d∗ < 1}. There is no
intersection set. Therefore, we can deduce that
∂E(Qpi
∗)
∂p0
< 0 and ∂E(Q
p
j
∗)
∂p0
< 0 can not coexist.
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Assuming that E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
is continuations and differentiable, we take the first and second partial
derivatives of E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
with respect to Qpi and Q
p
j , respectively under the four cases:
(1) Case I: rQpi + rQ
p
j ≤Q
p
i andrQ
p
i + rQ
p
j ≤Q
p
j
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpi
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ ∞
0
((1− r) p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ ∞
0
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r) p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
∫ (Qpi −x)/α
0
(s− (1− r) p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
((1− r) p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Qpj /(1−α)
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r) p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpj /α
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ Qpj −αx
0
(s− (1− r) p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpi
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (
Qpi
1−α , y)dy+
∫ Qpi +Qpj −Qpi /(1−α)
0
1
1−α (s− (1− r)p− q) f (
Qpi
1−α , y)dy
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
1
α
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, Q
p
i − x
α
)dx< 0
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∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx+
∫ Qpj /α
Qpi /(1−α)
1
1−α (s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Q
p
j −αx)dx
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
1
1−α (s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx< 0
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
=
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx< 0
(2) Case II : rQpi + rQ
p
j ≤Q
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i andrQ
p
i + rQ
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j ≥Q
p
j
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpi
=
∫ ∞
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ ∞
0
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ ∞
0
((1− r)p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
∫ (Qpi −x)/α
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(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi +Qpj
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
((1− r)p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Qpj /(1−α)
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
∫ Qpi +Qpj
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpi
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (
Qpi
1−α , y)d y
+
∫ Qpi +Qpj
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
1
α
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,
Qpi − x
α
)dx< 0
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx
+
∫ Qpi +Qpj
Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpi −Qpj α/(1−α)
0
1
1−α (s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx< 0
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∂Qpi
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ ∞
0
((1− r)p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ ∞
0
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
((1− r)p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ Qpj /α
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ Qpj −αx
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpi
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
(s− (1− r)p+ q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpi +Qpj −Qpi /(1−α)
0
1
1−α (s− (1− r)p+ q) f (
Qpi
1−α , y)d y
+
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (
Qpi
1−α , y)d y
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpj
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
(s− (1− r)p+ q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
+
∫ Qpj /α
Qpi /(1−α)
(s− (1− r)p+ q) f (x,Qpi −αx)d y
+
∫ ∞
0
1
1−α (−rp) f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
=
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
=
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
(s− (1− r)p+ q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx
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(4) Case IV: rQpi + rQ
p
j ≥Q
p
i andrQ
p
i + rQ
p
j ≥Q
p
j
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpi
=
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ Qpi /(1−α)
0
∫ ∞
0
((1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ ∞
Qpi /(1−α)
∫ ∞
0
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)
∂Qpj
=
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
∫ Qpi +Qpj −x
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy+
∫ ∞
0
∫ Qpj /(1−α)
0
((1− r)p− q) f (x, y)dxdy
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Qpj /(1−α)
(p+ q) f (x, y)dxdy− c
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpi
=
∫ ∞
0
−rp
1−α f (
Qpi
1−α , y)d y+
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx< 0
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂2Qpj
=
∫ ∞
0
−rp
1−α f (x,
Qpj
1−α )dx+
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx< 0
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
=
∂E
(
Qpi ,Q
p
j
)2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
=
∫ Qpi +Qpj
0
(s− (1− r)p− q) f (x,Qpi +Q
p
j − x)dx< 0
Then, we get the the Hessian Matrix under the above four cases as follows:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpi
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpi ∂Q
p
j
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂Qpj ∂Q
p
i
∂E(Qpi ,Q
p
j )
2
∂2Qpj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0.
Therefore, the expected profit functions have a maximum value. We have the result.
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C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Noting that zi and z j are independent of r, while zk depends on r, we first derive the derivatives
of zk and L(zk) with respect to r as follows:
∂zk
∂r = pv−pc[(1−r)p−v+q]2 fs(zk) ,
∂L(zk)
∂zk
= v−c(1−r)p−v+q , ∂L(zk)∂r =
p(v−c)2
[(1−r)p−v+q]3 fs(zk) .
Then
1) When λ rd 6 1, the expected profit function is shown in Eq.(??). Then the first derivative is
as follows:
dφpps
dr
= [(c−v)zi+ (p−v+ q)L(zi)]λσid + [(c−v)z j+ (p−v+ q)L(z j)]
λσ j
d
− [(c−v)zk+ (p−v+ q)L(zk)]
λ
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j
d
+2 pr
d
λL(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j −2
pr
d
(λui+λu j),
(C.1)
and
d2φpps
dr2
= 2 p
d
λ
[
L(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j − (ui+u j)
]
− p
2r(v− c)2
[(1− r)p−v+ q]3 fs(zk)
.
Multiplying the first term of d
2φpps
dr2 by r > 0, we obtain
2p
[
αL(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j −α(ui+u j)
]
. (C.2)
Because r > 0, Eq.(C.2) does not change sign. The first term αL(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j is the
loss function, which defines the expected demand excessing the order quantity (see, e.g., Silver et
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al., 1998). We subtract the expected loss sales from the mean uk to get the expected sales of the
probabilistic product as α(ui+u j)−αL(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j , which is supposed to be positive.
So we have 2pα
[
L(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j − (ui+u j)
]
< 0. As p2r(v−c)2[(1−r)p−v+q]3 fs(zk) > 0,
d2φpps
dr2 < 0.
2) When λ rd > 1,α= 1. Then all the customers would switch to buying the probabilistic product
and the expected profit function can be re-written as follow:
φpps = ((1− r)p− c)(ui+u j)− [(c−v)zk+ ((1− r)p−v+ q)L(zk)]
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j . (C.3)
Then first derivative dφppsdr =−p
(
(ui+u j)−L(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ2
)
. Similarly, we can rec-
ognize that (ui+u j)−L(zk)
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j is the expected sales of the probabilistic product
which is supposed to be positive. Therefore, dφppsdr < 0.
According to Eq.(6.1), given λ and d, we can deduce that φpps is also concave in α. Thus the
proposition is proved.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
From Proposition 5.1, we can find that the optimal price discount r∗ is located within the range
(0,min(d/λ,1)]. Therefore, we can just consider the expected profit when λ rd ≤ 1 and set Eq.(C.1)
to zero to determine the optimal price discount.
Let the first derivative dφppsdr = 0,
r = ([(c−v)zi+ (p−v+ q)L(zi)]ασi+ [(c−v)z j+ (p−v+ q)L(z j)]ασ j
−[(c−v)zk+ (p−v+ q)L(zk)]α
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j
)
/ (2p(uk−L(zk)σk)) .
Because the specific products have the same price/cost structure and
∫ zi
−∞ fs(x)dx = p−c+qp−v+q ,∫ z j
−∞ fs(x)dx = p−c+qp−v+q , and
∫ zk
−∞ fs(x)dx = (1−r
∗)p−c+q
(1−r∗)p−v+q , where fs(x) = 1p2pi e
−x2/2. Then zi = z j and
L(zi)= L(z j). However, zk and L(zk) are dependent on the optimal discount r∗. Therefore, the
optimal discount of r∗ meets the equation as follows:
Dc = 2pr(uk−L(zk)σk), (C.4)
where Dc = [(c−v)z+ (p−v+ q)L(z)](ασi+ασ j)− [(c−v)zk+ (p−v+ q)L(zk)]σk, zi = z j = z, and
L(zi)= L(z j)= L(z). Thus the proposition is proved.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5.4
1) The optimal profit φ∗ts and total order quantity Q
∗
ts in the traditional selling (TS) is as follows:
φ∗ts = (p− c)ui− [(c−v)zi+ (p−v+ q)L(zi)]σi
+ (p− c)u j−
[
(c−v)z j+ (p−v+ q)L(z j)
]
σ j.
(C.5)
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Q∗ts = ui+u j+ ziσi+ z jσ j.
Therefore,
φ∗pps−φ∗ts = [(c−v)z+ (p−v+ q)L(z)] (ασi+ασ j)− [(c−v)zk+ (p−v+ q)L(zk)]σk
− pr∗(uk−L(zk)σk).
Substituting Eq.(C.4) into Eq.(C.3), we get φ∗pps −φ∗ts = pr∗(uk −L(zk)σk) ≥ 0. Thus, the
proposition that φ∗pps ≥φ∗ts has been proved.
2) Next we compare the optimal order quantity Q∗pps in probabilistic selling with Q∗ts as
Q∗pps−Q∗ts =α∗Q∗d, where Q∗d = zk
√
σ2i +σ2j +2ρ i jσiσ j −ziσi−z jσ j. Taking the first derivative of
Q∗d with respect to r
∗ , we get ∂Q
∗
d
∂r∗ =
p(v−c)
√
σ2i+σ2j+2ρ i jσiσ j
[(1−r)p−v+q]2 fs(zk) < 0. Then Q
∗
d can achieves the maximum
when r∗→ 0. When r∗→ 0, we find that Q∗d ≤ 0 and limr∗→0(Q
∗
pps−Q∗ts)= 0. Thus, the proposition
that Q∗pps ≤Q∗ts has been proved.
3) With Q∗d ≤ 0 and
∂Q∗d
∂r∗ < 0, we can get that
∂(Q∗pps−Q∗ts)
∂r∗ = λd Q∗d+α∗
∂Q∗d
∂r∗ ≤ 0.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5.5
1) Taking the first derivative of φ∗pps−φ∗ts with respect to λ, we obtain
∂(φ∗pps−φ∗ts)
∂λ
= pr∗
(
ui
r∗
d
+u j r
∗
d
−L(zk)
r∗
d
√
σ2i +σ2j +2σiσ j
)
. (C.6)
Multiplying Eq.(C.6) by λ(λ> 0) does not change the sign. Then we obtain
λ
∂(φ∗pps−φ∗ts)
∂λ
= pr∗(uk−L(zk)σk)> 0. (C.7)
Similarly, we can prove that
∂(φ∗pps−φ∗ts)
∂d
=− 1
d
[pr∗(uk−L(zkσk))]< 0. (C.8)
2) Taking the first derivative of Q∗pps−Q∗ts with respect to λ, we obtain
∂(Q∗pps−Q∗ts)
∂λ
= r
∗
d
Q∗d < 0. (C.9)
Similarly, we can prove that
∂(Q∗pps−Q∗ts)
∂d
=− r
∗
d2
Q∗d > 0. (C.10)
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Appendix. Proposition 6.1
D.1 Probabilistic selling with barter in a fully covered market
(1) When 12 ≤ ϕ < ϕ¯, for given xˆ1 and xˆ2, the optimal prices that can extract the maximum
consumer surplus are expressed as follows (we let xˆ3=xˆ4=1/2 in Figure 6.2(a) to make sure that
the market is fully covered):
ppb0 =ϕ(1− t/2)+ (1−ϕ)(1− t(1−1/2)),
ppb1 =ϕtxˆ1+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ1)− txˆ1− (1−ϕ)αt(1−2xˆ1)+ p
pb
0 ,
ppb2 =ϕtxˆ2+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ2)−ϕαt(2xˆ2−1)− t(1− xˆ2)+ p
pb
0 .
(D.1)
Taking the first derivative of the profit with respect to xˆ1, we get
∂Gc
∂xˆ1
= (qα+ t(1−4x1)(−1+α)) (−1+
ϕ). Solving ∂Gc
∂xˆ1
= 0, we get xˆ1 = −t+qα+tα4t(−1+α) . Solving ∂Gc∂xˆ2 = (t(−3+4xˆ2)(−1+α)+ qα)ϕ = 0, we get
xˆ2 = −3t−qα+3tα4t(−1+α) , ∀ϕ ≥ 1/2. With optimal xˆ1 and xˆ2, the prices of the component products are
ppb1 = 12 (2+α(q− t)(1−ϕ)− tϕ), p
pb
2 = 12 (2+ qαϕ− t+ϕt−αtϕ), and p
pb
0 = 1− t/2. The profit of
probabilistic selling with barter in a fully covered market is
GAca =−
q2α2−2t(−1+α)(4+ qα)+ t2(−3+2α+α2)
8t(−1+α) − c. (D.2)
Obviously, GAca is independent of the allocation probability and the optimal allocation probability
is 12 ≤ϕ∗ < ϕ¯.
(2) When ϕ¯ ≤ ϕ < 1, for given xˆ1 and xˆ2, the optimal price that can extract the maximum
consumer surplus are expressed as follows (we let xˆ3=xˆ2 in Figure 6.2(b) to make sure that the
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market is fully covered):
ppb0 =ϕ(1− txˆ2)+ (1−ϕ)(1− t(1− xˆ2)+α(2xˆ2−1)),
ppb1 =ϕtxˆ1+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ1)− txˆ1− (1−ϕ)αt(1−2xˆ1)+ p
pb
0 ,
ppb2 =ϕtxˆ2+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ2)−ϕαt(2xˆ2−1)− t(1− xˆ2)+ p
pb
0 .
(D.3)
The profit function is the same as Eq. (6.3). Similarly, we get xˆ1 = −t+qα+tα4t(−1+α) and xˆ2 =
−t−tϕ−qαϕ+tαϕ
4t(−1+α)ϕ ,
and a resulting optimal profit is
GBca =−
q2α2ϕ+ t2 (1+ (−5+4α+α2)ϕ)−2tϕ(−4−4c(−1+α)+2α(2+ q(−1+ϕ))+α2(q−2qϕ))
8t(−1+α)ϕ .
(D.4)
Taking the first derivative, we can find that ∂G
B
ca
∂ϕ
= t−4q(−1+α)αϕ28(−1+α)ϕ2 < 0. Therefore, the optimal
ϕ∗ = 12(1−α) , which makes GBca = GAca. Therefore, the allocation probability that extracts the
maximum profit when ϕ≥ 12 is 12 ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯. Similarly, when ϕ≤ 12 , we can extract the allocation
probability 1−2α2(1−α) ≤ϕ∗ ≤ 12 . Thus, the optimal allocation probability for probabilistic selling with
barter is ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯
Furthermore, we set xˆ1 = −t+qα+tα4t(−1+α) ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ tq+t = α˜, to make sure that there are non-
negative demands for the component products. When α> α˜, i.e., xˆ1 = 0 and xˆ2 = 1, the seller only
sells the probabilistic product. Thus, the resulting profit is
G∗Ca = 1− c−
t
2
+ qα
2
. (D.5)
(3) Referring to the optimal decisions and resulting profit of traditional selling in Fay and
Xie (2008) (see Eq. (6.4)), we compare GCa and G∗Ca with GTs to get the optimal strategy for
probabilistic selling with barter.
a) GCa vs GTs
When c< 1− t, GCa−GTs =− (t(−1+α)−qα)
2
8t(−1+α) > 0. When c≥ 1− t, GCa−GTs =∆1 =
− q2α2−2t(−1+α)(4+qα)+t2(−3+2α+α2)8t(−1+α) − c− (1−c)
2
2t . Notice
∂∆1
∂c = 1−t−ct < 0 and the comparison result is
given by
GCa =
G
A
Ca if c≤ ¯¯c,
(1−c)2
2t if c> ¯¯c,
(D.6)
where ¯¯c= 1− t+ t/2
√
(t(1−α)+qα)2
t2(1−α) .
b) G∗Ca vs GTs
When c < 1− t, G∗Ca−GTs =
qα
2 > 0. When c ≥ 1− t, G∗Ca−GTs = ∆2 = 1− c− t2 +
qα
2 − (1−c)
2
2t .
Notice ∂∆2
∂c = 1−t−ct < 0 and the comparison result is given by
G∗Ca =
1− c−
t
2 + qα2 if c≤~c.
(1−c)2
2t ifc>~c,
(D.7)
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where~c= 1− t+pqtα .
Thus, we have derived the optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter in a fully
covered market. We summarize the optimal decisions on price and allocation probability, and the
resulting sales and profit in Table D.1.
Table D.1: Optimal decisions for probabilistic selling with barter when market is fully covered
α≤ α˜ α> α˜
D j
{−t+qα+tα
4t(−1+α) if c≤ ¯¯c
1−c
2t if c> ¯¯c
{
0 if c≤~c
1−c
2t if c>~c
D0
{ tα−qα−t
2t(−1+α) if c≤ ¯¯c
0 if c> ¯¯c
{
1 if c≤~c
0 if c>~c
ppb0
{
1− 12 t if c≤ ¯¯c
N/A if c> ¯¯c
{
1− 12 t if c≤~c
N/A if c>~c
ppb1
{
1
2 (2+α(q− t)(1−ϕ)− tϕ) if c≤ ¯¯c
1+c
2 if c> ¯¯c
{
N/A if c≤~c
1+c
2 if c>~c
ppb2
{
1
2 (2+α(q− t)ϕ− t(1−ϕ)) if c≤ ¯¯c
1+c
2 if c> ¯¯c
{
N/A if c≤~c
1+c
2 if c>~c
Gpb
{
GACa if c≤ ¯¯c
(1−c)2
2t if c> ¯¯c
{
G∗Ca if c≤~c
(1−c)2
2t if c>~c
ϕ∗
{
¯¯ϕ≤ϕ≤ ϕ¯ if c≤ ¯¯c
N/A if c> ¯¯c
{
¯¯ϕ≤ϕ≤ ϕ¯ if c≤~c
N/A if c>~c
Note:~c= 1− t+pqtα and ¯¯c= 1− t+ t/2
√
(t(1−α)+qα)2
t2(1−α) .
D.2 Probabilistic selling with barter in a partially covered
market
(1) When 12 ≤ϕ< ϕ¯ (as shown in Figure 2(a)), the profit function is given by
GAIa = (ppd01 −c)(xˆ3−xˆ1)+(p
pd
02 −c)(xˆ2−xˆ4)+(p1−c)xˆ1+(p2−c)(1−xˆ2)+(xˆ3−xˆ1)qα(1−ϕ)+(xˆ2−xˆ4)qαϕ,
(D.8)
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where ppd01 and p
pd
02 are the price for the probabilistic product. For given xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3, and xˆ4, the
optimal prices that can extract the maximum consumer surplus are expressed as
ppd01 =ϕ(1− txˆ3)+ (1−ϕ)(1− t(1− xˆ3)+ tα(1−2xˆ3)),
ppd02 =ϕ(1− txˆ4+αt(2xˆ4−1))+ (1−ϕ)(1− t(1− xˆ4)),
ppd1 =ϕtxˆ1+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ1)− txˆ1− (1−ϕ)αt(1−2xˆ1)+ p
pd
01 ,
ppd2 =ϕtxˆ2+ (1−ϕ)t(1− xˆ2)−ϕαt(2xˆ2−1)− t(1− xˆ2)+ p
pd
02 .
(D.9)
Taking the first derivatives of the profit with respect to xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆ3, and xˆ4, and setting
them to zero, we get xˆ1 = −t+qα+tα4t(−1+α) , xˆ2 = −3t−qα+3tα4t(−1+α) , xˆ3 =
−1+c+t−qα−tα−tϕ+qαϕ+tαϕ
2t(1−2α−2ϕ+2αϕ) , and xˆ4 =
−1+c+2t−3tϕ−qαϕ+3tαϕ
2t(1−2ϕ+2αϕ) . Given that the price of the probabilistic product is p
pd
0 = p
pd
01 = p
pd
02 , the
optimal ϕ∗ = 1/2. Substituting ϕ∗ into xˆ3 and xˆ4, we get the optimal xˆ3 = 2−2c−t+qα+αt4αt and
xˆ4 = −2+2c+t−qα+3αt4αt . Notice that the seller chooses to make positive sales of the probabilistic
product when xˆ3 > xˆ1 or xˆ4 < xˆ2, and the market is partially covered if xˆ3 < 1/2 or xˆ4 > 1/2.
Thus we can deduce the condition on the product cost as c˜< c< ˜˜c, where c˜= 1− 12 t+ qα−αt2 and
˜˜c= 1− 12 t+ qα2(1−α) . The profit is expressed as follows:
GAIa =
t(1−α)
8α
+ q
2α2
8t(−1+α)α +
4t+2(−2+ q)αt+8c+4ct(−1+α)+4cqα+4+4c2+4qα
8tα
. (D.10)
(2) When 1>ϕ≥ ϕ¯, we get the optimal xˆ1 = −t+qα+tα4t(−1+α) , xˆ2 = −1+c+2t2t , and xˆ3 =
−1+c+t−tϕ−qαϕ+tαϕ
2t(1−2ϕ+2αϕ) .
And we can get the optimal profit as follows:
GBIa =−
1
8t(−1+α)(1+2(−1+α)ϕ) [−4(−1+ c)
2(−1+α)2ϕ−4(−1+ c)q(−1+α)αϕ
+ t2(−1+α2(1−3ϕ)+ϕ+2α3ϕ)+ q2α2(1+ (−3+2α)ϕ)+2t(−1+α)
(−2+2ϕ−2αϕ+2c(1+ (−1+α)ϕ)+ qα(−1+ (3−2α)ϕ+4(−1+α)ϕ2))].
(D.11)
Because
∂GBIa
∂ϕ
< 0, the optimal ϕ = 12(1−α) . Notice that the denominator of xˆ3 is zero when ϕ =
1
2(1−α) . Thus, xˆ3 approaches to 1 and the market reduces to a fully covered market, i.e., xˆ3=xˆ2=1.
Therefore, the optimal profit in the partially covered market is G Ia =GAIa with c˜ < c < ˜˜c. Also
when α > α˜, i.e., xˆ1 = 0 and xˆ2 = 1), the seller only sells the probabilistic product. Thus, the
resulting profit is
G∗Ia =
4c2+ (2+ qα)2−4c(2+ t(−1+α)+ qα)+ t2(1−6α+5α2)−2t(2+ (−2+ q)α+ qα2)
8tα
. (D.12)
(3) We then compare G Ia and G∗Ia with GTs to derive the optimal strategy for probabilistic selling
with barter in a partially covered market.
a) G Ia vs GTs
Because c˜> 1− t, we can only consider the case where c> 1− t. Notice that α≤ α˜ and ˜˜c≤ 1, so
G Ia−GTs = (2+2c(−1+α)+t(−1+α)−2α+qα)
2
8t(1−α)α > 0. Therefore, the strategy for probabilistic selling when
94
D.3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1
α≤ tq+t in a partially covered market is given by
G Ia =

1− t/2− c if c≤ 1− t,
(1−c)2
2t if 1− t< c≤ c˜,
GAIa if c˜< c< ˜˜c,
(1−c)2
2t if c≥ ˜˜c.
(D.13)
b) G∗Ia vs GTs
Because c˜> 1− t, we can only consider the case where c> 1− t.
G∗Ia− (1−c)
2
2t =∆3 = 4−4c
2(−1+α)−4α+4qα+q2α2−4c(2+t(−1+α)+(−2+q)α)+t2(1−6α+5α2)−2t(2+(−2+q)α+qα2)
8tα .
∂2∆3
∂c2 = 1−αtα > 0. And we get c1 and c2 to make ∆3 = 0. Furthermore, we prove that c1 > c˜, c1 > 1,
and c2 < c˜. Therefore, ∆3 < 0 and the strategy for probabilistic selling when α> α˜ in a partially
covered market is given by
G∗Ia =
1− t/2− c if c≤ 1− t,(1−c)2
2t if c> 1− t.
(D.14)
Thus, we have derived the optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter in a partially
covered market. Also referring to the optimal decision results of traditional selling in Fay and
Xie (2008), we summarize the optimal decisions on the price and allocation probability, and the
resulting sales and profit when market is partially covered in Table D.2.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 6.1
(1) When 0<α≤ α˜,
Notice that ¯¯c− c˜= 1− t+ t+qα−tα
2
p
1−α − (1− t+
t+qα−tα
2 )> 0, then we compare GCa with G Ia when
c˜< c≤ ¯¯c. We get G Ia−GCa = (−2+2c+t−qα+tα)
2
8tα > 0. Therefore, the optimal strategy for probabilistic
selling with barter can be expressed as follows:
Gbp =Max [GCa,G Ia,GTs]=

GACa if c≤ c˜, ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
GAIa if c˜< c< ˜˜c, ϕ∗ = 12 ,
GTs if c≥ ˜˜c.
(D.15)
(2) When α˜<α< 1,
It is easy to obtain the optimal optimal strategy for probabilistic selling with barter as follows:
G∗bp =Max
[
G∗Ca,G
∗
Ia,GTs
]=
G
∗
Ca if c≤~c , ¯¯ϕ≤ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ¯,
GTs if~c< c≤ 1.
(D.16)
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Table D.2: Optimal decisions of probabilistic selling with barter when market is partially covered
α≤ α˜ α> α˜
D j

1
2 if c≤ 1− t
1−c
2t if 1− t< c≤ c˜
−t+qα+tα
4t(−1+α) if if c˜< c< ˜˜c
1−c
2t if c≥ ˜˜c
{
1
2 if c≤ 1− t
1−c
2t if c> 1− t
D0
{2−2c−t−2α+2cα+qα+tα
2tα−2tα2 if c˜< c< ˜˜c
0 if others
N/A
ppb0
{
1
4 (2+2c+ t(−1+α)− qα) if c˜< c< ˜˜c
N/A if others
N/A
ppbj
{
2−t
2 if c≤ 1− t
1+c
2 if c> 1− t
{
2−t
2 if c≤ 1− t
1+c
2 if c> 1− t
Gpb

1− t2 − c if c≤ 1− t
(1−c)2
2t if 1− t< c≤ c˜
GAIa if if c˜< c< ˜˜c
(1−c)2
2t if c≥ ˜˜c
{
1− t2 − c if c≤ 1− t
(1−c)2
2t if c> 1− t
ϕ
{
1
2 if c˜< c< ˜˜c
N/A if others
N/A
Note: c˜= 1− 12 t+ qα−αt2 and ˜˜c= 1− 12 t+ qα2(1−α) .
D.4 Proof of Proposition 6.2
(1) Full coverage
xˆ2− xˆ1 = 12 + qα2t(1−α) , ∂(xˆ2−xˆ1)∂α = q2t(−1+α)2 > 0, and
∂(xˆ2−xˆ1)
∂q = α2t(1−α) > 0.
(2) Partial coverage
∂(xˆ3−xˆ1)
∂q = α4tα−4tα2 > 0, and
∂(xˆ2−xˆ4)
∂q = α4tα−4tα2 > 0.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 6.5
From proposition 5.5, offering barter is more advantageous when c¯< c< ˜˜c if α≤ α˜, and c<~c if
α> α˜ & q≥ 1/3t. Taking the first derivatives of c¯, ˜˜c, and~c with respective to α and simplifying, we
have ∂c¯
∂α
= q2α2(3−2α)+2(q−t)(−1+α)(1+t(−1+α)α)+2qtα(−1+α)2
2(−1+α)
p
(−1+α)α2(−2qt(−1+α)+t2(−1+α)+q2α) < 0,
∂ ˜˜c
∂α
= q2(−1+α)2 > 0, and ∂~c∂α =
qt
2
p
qtα > 0.
Therefore, the result holds.
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D.6 Proof of the comparison results in Figure 6.3
(1) GACa vs Gps
GACa −Gps = ∆4 =
α(−2qt(−1+α)+t2(−1+α)+q2α)
8t(1−α) , and
∂2∆4
∂α2
= − q24t(−1+α)3 > 0. Therefore, we solve
∆4 = 0 and get α1 = 0 and α2 = −2qt+t
2
(q−t)2 . Notice that α2 ≤ 0 when q ≥ t2 , and α2 ≥ α˜ when q ≤ t3 .
Thus, the comparison results are as follows:
When q≤ t3 ,
α≤ α˜, GACa−Gps < 0 if c≤ c˜,
and when t3 < q< t2 ,
α≤α2, GACa−Gps ≤ 0 if c≤ c˜,
α2 ≤ α˜, GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ c˜,
and when t2 ≤ q< t,
α≤ α˜, GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ c˜,
and when q≥ t,
α≤ α˜, GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ.
(2) GAIa vs Gps
GAIa−Gps =∆5, and ∂
2∆5
∂α2
= 1tα > 0. Therefore, the solutions of ∆5 = 0 are c3 and c4 as follows:
c3 = −2+ t+2α− qα+ qα
2− tα2−
√
(−1+α)α2((t2−2qt)(−1+α)+ q2α)
2(−1+α) ,
c4 = −2+ t+2α− qα+ qα
2− tα2+
√
(−1+α)α2((t2−2qt)(−1+α)+ q2α)
2(−1+α) .
Notice that α≤α2 makes (−1+α)α2(−2qt(−1+α)+ t2(−1+α)+q2α)≥ 0, and then c3 and c4 exist.
We derive that when q< t2 , then α2 > 0 and when q≥ t3 , then α2 ≤ α˜. Furthermore, c˜− c3 < 0 and
c˜− c4 > 0. Let c¯ denote c3, the comparison results are as follows:
When q≤ t3 ,
α≤ α˜,
G
A
Ia−Gps ≤ 0 if c˜< c≤ c¯,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c¯< c≤ cˆ,
and when t3 < q< t2 ,
α≤α2,
G
A
Ia−Gps ≤ 0 if c˜< c≤ c¯,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c¯< c≤ cˆ,
α2 <α≤ α˜, GAIa−Gps > 0 if c˜< c≤ cˆ,
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and when t2 ≤ q≤ t,
α≤ α˜, GAIa−Gps > 0 if c˜< c≤ cˆ.
(3) G∗Ca vs Gps
G∗Ca−Gps =∆6 = qα− t4 . Thus, ∆6 > 0 when α> t4q , and ∆6 ≤ 0 when α≤ t4q . Therefore, the
comparison results are as follows:
When 0< q≤ t4 ,
α˜<α< 1, G∗Ca−Gps < 0 if c<~c,
and when t4 < q≤ t3 ,
α˜<α≤ t
4q
, G∗Ca−Gps < 0 if c<~c,
t
4q
<α< 1, G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c< cˆ,
and when q> t3 ,
α˜<α< 1, G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c< cˆ.
(4) The comparison results
When 0≤ q< 14 t,
0<α≤ α˜, ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps < 0 if c≤ c˜,
GAIa−Gps ≤ 0 if c˜< c≤ c¯,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c¯< c< cˆ,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if cˆ≤ c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if c≥ ˜˜c,
α˜<α< 1, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps < 0 if c≤~c,
GTs−Gps < 0 ~c< c≤ cˆ,
GTs−GTs ≤ 0 if cˆ< c≤ 1,
and when 14 t< q≤ 13 t,
0<α≤ α˜, ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps < 0 if c≤ c˜,
GAIa−Gps ≤ 0 if c˜< c≤ c¯,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c¯< c< cˆ,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if cˆ≤ c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if c≥ ˜˜c,
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α˜<α≤ t
4q
, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps < 0 if c≤~c,
GTs−Gps < 0 ~c< c≤ cˆ,
GTs−GTs ≤ 0 if cˆ< c≤ 1,
t
4q
<α< 1, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ,
G∗Ca−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c≤~c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if~c< c≤ 1,
and when 13 t< q≤ 12 t,
0<α≤ t
2−2qt
(q− t)2 , ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps < 0 if c≤ c˜,
GAIa−Gps ≤ 0 if c˜< c≤ c¯,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c¯< c< cˆ,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if cˆ≤ c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if c≥ ˜˜c,
t2−2qt
(q− t)2 <α≤ α˜, ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ c˜,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c˜< c≤ cˆ,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if ˜˜c≤ c< 1,
α˜<α< 1, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ,
G∗Ca−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c≤~c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if~c< c≤ 1,
and when 12 t< q< t,
0<α≤ α˜, ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ c˜,
GAIa−Gps > 0 if c˜< c≤ cˆ,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if ˜˜c≤ c≤ 1,
α˜<α≤ 1, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ,
G∗Ca−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c<~c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if~c≤ c≤ 1,
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and when q≥ t,
0<α≤ α˜, ∆bp−ps =

GACa−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ,
GACa−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c≤ c˜,
GAIa−GTs > 0 if c˜< c< ˜˜c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if ˜˜c≤ c≤ 1,
α˜<α≤ 1, ∆bp−ps =

G∗Ca−Gps > 0 if c≤ cˆ,
G∗Ca−GTs > 0 if cˆ< c≤~c,
GTs−GTs = 0 if~c< c≤ 1,
where c¯ = 1− t2 + qα−tα2 +
p
(−1+α)α2(−2qt(−1+α)+t2(−1+α)+q2α)
2(1−α) , cˆ = 1− 12 t, c˜ = 1− 12 t+ qα−αt2 , and ˜˜c =
1− 12 t+ qα2(1−α) .
D.7 Proof of Table. 6.2
We replace the successful barter probability α with 4kϕ(1−ϕ) in the pricing, i.e., Eq. (D.1), and
corresponding profit functions, i.e., Eq. (6.3), in the fully covered market.
(1) When 12 ≤ϕ≤ ϕ¯,
Taking the first derivatives of the profit with respective to xˆ1 and xˆ2, we get the optimal
xˆ1 = t+4k(q+t)(−1+ϕ)ϕ4t(1+4k(−1+ϕ)ϕ) , xˆ2 =
3t−4kϕ(q−3t)(−1+ϕ)
4t(1+4kϕ(−1+ϕ)) , and a resulting profit is
GACa =
16k2(−1+ϕ)2ϕ2(q2+1)+ t2(−3−8k(−1+ϕ)ϕ)
8t(1+4k(−1+ϕ)ϕ) +1−kq(−1+ϕ)ϕ− c. (D.17)
Taking the first derivative of GACa, we get
∂GACa
∂ϕ
= k(−1+2ϕ)(8kq2(−1+ϕ)ϕ(1+2k(−1+ϕ)ϕ))2t(1+4k(−1+ϕ)ϕ)2 − q+ t2 . Taking
the first and second derivative of
∂GACa
∂ϕ
with respect to k, we find
∂GACa
∂ϕ
is concave with respect to
k with the second derivative −8q2(−1+ϕ)ϕ(−1+2ϕ)(−1+2k(−1+ϕ)ϕ)t(1+4k(−1+ϕ)ϕ)4 < 0. Thus, we set
∂GACa
∂ϕ
to zero and
get solutions k0 = 0,k1 = −2q+t4(q−t)(−ϕ+ϕ2) ,k2 = − t4(−q+t)(−ϕ+ϕ2) . Furthermore, xˆ1 ≤ 0 and xˆ2 ≤ 1 (i.e.
k˜≤ t4(q+t)(1−ϕ)ϕ ) to make sure that there are non-negative demands for the component products.
Therefore, we deduce that
∂GACa
∂ϕ
< 0 except for the case when q< t2 and k≤ k1.
When k> k˜, the seller only sellers the probabilistic product with xˆ1 = 0 and xˆ2 = 1. Thus, the
resulting profit is
G∗Ca = 1− c−
t
2
+2qkϕ(1−ϕ). (D.18)
It is easy to find that
∂G∗Ca
∂ϕ
< 0 and the optimal ϕ∗ = 12 . Therefore, the result holds.
(2) When ϕ ≥ ϕ¯, we get the optimal xˆ1 = t+4k(q+t)(−1+ϕ)ϕ4t(1+4k(−1+ϕ)ϕ) and xˆ2 =
−4kϕq(−1+ϕ)ϕ+t
4t(1+4kϕ(−1+ϕ))ϕ + 14 , and a
resulting profit as follows:
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GBCa = 18t(1+4kϕ(−1+ϕ))ϕ (16kϕ2q2(−1+ϕ)2ϕ+ t2(1+ (−5+16kϕ+16kϕ2)ϕ−16kϕ(1+2kϕ)ϕ2+
16kϕ5)+8tϕ(1+ c(−1−4kϕ(−1+ϕ))+2kϕ(2+ q(−1+ϕ))(−1+ϕ)+4kϕ2q(−1+ϕ)2(−1+2ϕ))).
The first derivative is
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
= 18t(1+4kϕ(−1+ϕ))2ϕ2 (32kϕ2q2(1+2kϕ(−1+ϕ))(−1+ϕ)ϕ2+ t2(−1+
4kϕ(−1+ϕ)2+32kϕ2(−1+ϕ)ϕ2+64kϕ3(−1+ϕ)2ϕ2)+32kϕqt(−1+ϕ)ϕ2(1+kϕ(−6+8ϕ)+4kϕ2(3−
7ϕ+4ϕ2))). And it is easy to prove that the first two terms are negative, and we have to prove that
if I= 1+kϕ(−6+8ϕ)+4kϕ2(3−7ϕ+4ϕ2) is positive. Taking the first, second, and third derivative
of I with respect to ϕ, we get ∂I
∂ϕ
= 8kϕ+4kϕ2(−7+8ϕ)+ k(−6+8ϕ)+8kϕ(3−7ϕ+4ϕ2), ∂2I
∂ϕ2
=
2k(20−84ϕ+96ϕ2), and ∂3I
∂ϕ3
= 24k(−7+16ϕ)> 0. Thus, ∂I
∂ϕ
is convex. Setting ∂I
∂ϕ
to zero, we get
the solution ϕ= 116 (7+ (−225+8
p
894 )1/3
32/3 − 13(3(−225+8p894 ))1/3 which is less than 1/2. Therefore,
∂I
∂ϕ
> 0.
The minimum Iϕ=1/2 = 1− k2 is positive. And then
∂GBCa
∂ϕ
< 0, and the optimal is ϕ∗ = ϕ¯ which makes
ppd0 = 1− t/2 and GBCa =GACa. Therefore, the optimal GCa =GACa ≥GBCa.
D.8 Proof of Proposition 6.6
The seller that uses probabilistic selling with barter will choose either full coverage, i.e., GACa,
or partial coverage, i.e., G Ia, depending on which yields a higher profit. The comparison results
when k> k1 or q> t/2 will be the same with previous proof for ϕ∗ = 12 . The difference is α= k and
α˜= k˜= tq+t . We just need to give the sketch proof when k≤ k1 and q/2.
(1) GACa vs GTs when k≤ k1 and q/2
When c< 1− t, GACa−GTs =
(t+q(−1+2ϕ))2
16tϕ > 0. When c> 1− t, ∆GACa−GTs = (t
2(1−8ϕ)−8(c−1)2ϕ+
(2qt+ q2(2ϕ−1))(2ϕ−1))/(16tϕ)+1− c. ∂∆
∂c =
−16(−1+c)ϕ−16tϕ
16tϕ and
∂2∆
∂c2 = −1t < 0, the comparison
result is given by:
GCa
G
A
Ca if c≤ c′,
(1−c)2
2t if c> c′,
where c′ = 1− t+ (2qϕ¯−q+t)
p
2ϕ¯
4ϕ¯ .
(2) GACa vs GPs
When k ≤ k1 and q/2, the optimal allocation strategy is ϕ∗ = ϕ¯. And ϕ¯ is the solution of
the equation 8kϕ2(1−ϕ)= 2ϕ−1. Substituting k = (2ϕ−1)/(8ϕ2(1−ϕ)) into Eq. (D.17), we get
q2(1−2ϕ)2+2qt(−1+2ϕ)+t(t+16ϕ−8tϕ)
16tϕ − c.
Then ∆GCa−GPs =− (−2qt+t
2+q2(1−2ϕ))(−1+2ϕ)
16tϕ . Solving ∆GCa−GPs to zero, we get solutions ϕ1 = 12
and ϕ2 = (q−t)
2
2q2 . Taking the derivatives of ∆GCa−GPs with respect to ϕ, we get
∂∆
∂ϕ
=− q2−2qt+t2−4q2ϕ216tϕ2 ,
∂2∆
∂ϕ2
= (q−t)28tϕ3 > 0. Because the maximum ϕ¯ can be achieved with the maximum k1. Therefore, we
substitute k1 into 8kϕ2(1−ϕ) = 2ϕ−1 and get maximum ϕ¯ = t−q2q . And it’s easy to prove that
ϕ¯<ϕ2 and ∆ϕ=ϕ¯ =− (−2q+t)
2
8t < 0. Then ∆GCa−GPs < 0. The result is proved.
(3) GACa vs G Ia
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Due to the complexity of the equations of G Ia, we conduct the simulation in Mathematics to
prove G Ia >GCa. Then we prove c˜≤ c′ ≤ ˜˜c to derive the condition for the proposition 6.6.
Substituting k= 2ϕ¯−18(1−ϕ¯)ϕ¯2 into ˜˜c, we get ˜˜c=
q−2qϕ¯−(−2+t)(−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3)
2(−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3) . Then ∆c′− ˜˜c = 14 (4−4t+
p
2 (t+q(−1+2ϕ¯))p
ϕ¯
+ 2(q(−1+2ϕ¯)+(−2+t)(−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3))−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3 ) and ∂∆∂q = (−1+ 2ϕ¯)
p
2
[p
2ϕ¯−1+2(1−2ϕ¯)2ϕ¯
]
(−1+2(1−2ϕ¯)2ϕ¯)pϕ¯ . Notice
that 8kϕ¯2(1− ϕ¯)= 2ϕ¯−1, the maximum ϕ¯ can be achieved when k= 1 and −1+2(1−2ϕ¯)2ϕ¯= 0.
Therefore, −1+2(1−2ϕ¯)2ϕ¯≤ 0, and√2ϕ¯ −1+2(1−2ϕ¯)2ϕ¯> 0. Finally, we prove that ∂∆
∂q < 0. Then
∆c′− ˜˜c is highest when q= 0 and ∆c′− ˜˜c = 14 t(−2+
p
2p
ϕ
)≤ 0. Therefore, c′ ≤ ˜˜c.
Similarly, we prove that c′ ≥ c˜. Substituting k= 2ϕ¯−18(1−ϕ¯)ϕ¯2 into c˜, we get c˜= 1− t2 −
(q−t)(−1+2ϕ¯)
16(−1+ϕ¯)ϕ¯2 .
∆c′−c˜ = 14
(
−2t+ 2q(−1+2ϕ¯)−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3 +
p
2 (t+q(−1+2ϕ¯))p
ϕ¯
)
. Taking the first derivative of ∆c′−c˜, we get
∂∆c′−c˜
∂q =
1
4
(p
2 (−1+2ϕ¯)p
ϕ¯
+ 2(−1+2ϕ¯)−1+2ϕ¯−8ϕ¯2+8ϕ¯3
)
< 0. Therefore, the lowest ∆c′−c˜ can be achieved when q= t/2. Fur-
thermore, the maximum ϕ¯= t−q2q = 12 . We then substitute ϕ¯ into ∆c′−c˜ and find that ∆c′−c˜ ≥ 0. The
result is proved.
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